Readjustment and Reform in the Chinese Economy by Prybyla, Jan S.
OcCAsioNAl PApERS/ 
REpRiNTs SERiEs 
iN CONTEMpoRARY 
AsiAN STUdiEs 
NUMBER 2 - 1981 (39) 
READJUSTMENT AND REFORM IN 
THE CHINESE ECONOMY 
Jan S. Prybyla 
J School of LAw ~() UNivERSiTy . 
of 
. MARylANd~ 
.. 
0 
I 
0 
0 
[k.~ 
0 
' 
~ 
1 
"DJ ~ ~ 
• 
~ 
o o' 
c: 
0 
Occasional Papers/Reprint Series 
in Contemporary Asian Studies 
General Editor: Hungdah Chiu 
Acting Executive Editor: David Salem 
Managing Editor: Julia Fang 
Editorial Advisory Board 
Professor Robert A. Scalapino, University of California 
at Berkeley 
Professor Martin Wilbur, Columbia University 
Professor Gaston J. Sigur, George Washington University 
. Professor Shao-chuan Leng, University of Virginia 
Professor Lawrence W. Beer, University of Colorado 
Professor James Hsiung, New York University 
Dr. Robert Heuser, Max-Planck-Institute for Comparative Public 
Law and International Law at Heidelberg 
Dr. Lih-wu Han, Political Science Association of the 
Republic of China 
Professor K. P. Misra, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India 
Professor J. S. Prybyla, The Pennsylvania State University 
Professor Toshio Sawada, Sophia University, Japan 
Published with the cooperation of the Maryland International Law Society. 
All contributions (in English only) and communications should be sent to 
Professor Hungdah Chiu, University of Maryland School of Law, 
500 West Baltimore Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21201 USA. 
All publications in this series reflect only the views of the authors. 
While the editor accepts responsibility for the selection of materials to be 
published, the individual author is responsible f{)r statements of facts and expressions 
of opinion contained therein. 
Subscription is US $10.00 for 8 issues (regardless of the price of individual issues) 
in the United States and Canada and $12.00 for overseas. Check should be addressed to 
OPRSCAS and sent to Professor Hungdah Chiu. 
Price for single copy of this issue: US $2.00 
OPRSCAS no. 2-1981 
ISSN 0730-0107 
ISBN 0-942182-38-3 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Preliminary Remarks . ... .. .. . .. .. .. . .... .. .... .... . . . . . . . . . . .. . ... .. . .. .... . ... .. .. . 1 
Balanced Development Planning .. ..... .. .. ...... ...... ...... .... ....... 3 
Imbalance Between the Performance of Industry and 
Agriculture ..... . . .... . . . .. ... . . .. . . . . ... ... . ... ..... ... . .. .. . . .. ... ... ... . . 3 
Imbalance Within Agriculture ....................................... 14 
Imbalance Between Light and Heavy Industry ........... 15 
Imbalance Within Light Ind1Jstry .................................. 16 
Imbalance Within Heavy Industry ..... :.......................... 17 
Imbalance Between Accumulation (Investment) and 
Consumption ... .. ... .. ..... ........... .... .. . . ...... .... . .... ... .... .. .... 18 
Imbalance Within Accumulation ................................... 19 
Balanced Development Planning & Tentative Evaluation 21 
Management of the Firm ......... ....... ................... ...... ..... . 22 
Agriculture ... . .... .. . . . ...... . ..... . .. . . . . ... .... ..... ........... ... .... . ..... . . 22 
Private Plots and Village Fairs (san zi yi bao) ....... 25 
Commune Corporations ...... .. ...... ... .. .... ........... ........... 28 
Industry ................. .. ...... ....... .. . . . . . ...... ....... ..... .... .. . ..... ..... . . 28 
Incentives to Firms . ... . . .. .. . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . .. . 28 
Incentives to Workers and Staff ................................ 40 
Epilogue . . . . . . . . .. . . ... . . . .. . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. .. .. . . . . .. . .. .. .. .. .. . . . . 46 
Supplement and Update ...................................................... 46 
(March 1981) Balanced Development Planning ........... 48 
Management of the Firm . . . .. .. .. .. . . . .. . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . .. . . .. .. . . 54 

READJUSTMENT AND REFORM IN 
THE CHINESE ECONOMY 
BY JAN S. PRYBYLA 
Preliminary Remarks* 
In an article "China in the 1980s" published in the May-June 
1980 issue of Challenge I discussed various problems troubling the 
Chinese economy and the policy responses of the post-Mao leadership. 
This paper continues the review in the light of information obtained 
since that time. 
Since the death of Mao Zedong (September 1976) and the arrest 
of his leftwing associates (October 1976), two steps forward and one 
step back have been taken in the matter of economic planning. In 
February 1978, Hua Guofeng unveiled a grandiose Ten-Year Plan for 
the Development of the National Economy flanked by a Ten-Year 
Plan for the Development of Science and Technology for the period 
1976-85. 1 The plans suffered from two major defects: they were too 
ambitious in their objectives and too flimsy in their methodology. 
They were scrapped in 1980 and replaced by three sets of plans: a 
transitional three-year plan of "Readjustment, Restructuring, Con-
solidation, and Improvement" (1978-80); a five-year plan (1981-85); 
and a ten-year plan (1981-90).2 This paper concentrates on the 
transitional plan (1978-80) and on policy intentions for 1981. 
For the sake of expositional convenience I make a distinction 
between policies of "readjustment" and those of "reform." Readjust-
ment refers to measures taken to improve the operation of the 
existing system of administrative command without, however, affect-
ing the basic operational principles of the system. Reform refers to 
policies which change the system in fundamental ways. ~hile one 
* Condensed version of a paper given on November 6, 1980 to the Economic 
Planning Workshop, University of Pennsylvania. Jan S. Prybyla is Professor of 
Economics at Pennsylvania State University and Visiting Professor, University of 
Arizona at Tucson. 
1. Hua Guofeng, Report on the Work of the Government to the 1st Session, 5th 
National People's Congress, February 26, 1978, Peking Review, March 10, 1978. pp. 
7-40. I have analyzed this plan in "Changes in the Chinese Economy: An Interpreta-
tion," Asian Survey, Vol. XIX, No. 5, May 1979, pp. 409-435. 
2. Hua Guofeng, Report on the Work of the Government to the 3rd Session. 5th 
National People's Congress, September 7, 1980, Beijing Review, September 22, 1980, 
pp. 12-29, and Yao Yilin, Report on the Arrangements for the National Economic Plans 
for 1980 and 1981, ibid., pp. 30-43. 
(1) 
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should not build a conceptual great wall between the two, the 
distinction is useful. I believe that the changes in the economy 
effected so far, as well as those contemplated for 1981-85, fall 
predominantly into the "readjustment" category. The possibility of 
more important systemic changes to come is not excluded at this 
stage.3 As I see it, the system of administrative command that had 
been in place from 1961 to 1966 (in essence, modified Stalinism) has 
been cleansed during the last four years of most of its leftist 
accretions acquired during the Cultural Revolution of 1966-76, and it 
has been modernized, that is, adapted to changed historical 
circumstances.4 The question now is where to go from here. 
To date, the changes have been of two kinds: controlled 
experiments in selected economic units and locations (of which the 
so-called "Sichuan experiment" in enterprise management is the best 
known), and nationwide measures. In general, the controlled labora-
tory experiments are potentially more reformist than have been the 
measures thus far adopted nationwide. As with earlier such experi-
ments elsewhere (e.g., the "Bolshevichka" and "Mayak" management 
changes in the U.S.S.R. of the 1960s), several problems have surfaced 
in connection with the Chinese experiments. First, the enterprises 
selected for experimentation were, by and large, not typical of 
enterprises in their branch or sector. More often than not the pilot 
firms were above the average to begin with, which, of course, has 
3. "Generally speaking the break with the old has not been sufficient and we are 
still a long way from the goal of the reform. Over the past year or so. only a breach has 
been made in the old system, but we must advance on the crest of this victory ... We 
can during the next few years only make minor reforms to create conditions for major 
ones." Xue Muqiao, "Some Opinions on Reforming the Economic System," Renmin 
Ribao, June 10, 1980, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), June 25, 1980. 
"All the economic reform measures of 1978-81 ... are aimed at promoting the 
readjustment of the economy. . . But these measures are only of a preliminary nature. 
The overall restructuring of management of our economy calls for further investigation 
and study, the summing-up of experience, deeper theoretical exploration and the 
absorption of the strong points of other countries which are relevant and useful." Yao 
Yilin, op. cit., pp. 42-43 
4. The 1961-66 system is associated with the formerly disgraced, now rehabili-
tated Liu Shaoqi. The name given to it was strikingly similar to that given to the 
current transitional plans. It was called "Readjustment, Consolidation, Filling-Out, 
and Raising Standards." It came in the wake of the damage inflicted on the economy by 
the leftist Great Leap Forward (1958-60). By and large, the people in charge of the 
1961-66 system were the same as those in charge of the post-Mao economy (1977-8ll. 
The 1961-66 system is described in my The Political Economy of Communist China 
(Scranton: International Textbook Company, 1970), Chapter 9. 
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biased the results. Second, even with generally positive results, 
"quite a few new problems have cropped up in the process of 
experimentation."" Third, "pilot projects in some units conflicted with 
the existing overall administrative system." In other words, the pilot 
projects operated in a hostile or, at least, uncongenial systemic 
environment. Fourth, "many reforms were conducted individually 
and were not coordinated with one another." Fifth, "many comrades' 
ideological consciousness could not keep pace with the conditions. 
They dealt with new problems on the basis of their old experiences."" 
In other words, there has been something less than perfect profession-
al competence in implementing th~ changes (most managers are 
simply not used to making decisions by themselves), and there has 
been ideological foot-dragging due to the cadres' fear of possible 
future retribution by a reborn left. 7 The experience of other socialist 
countries with readjustment and reform (especially Hungary) sug-
gests that the longer reform is put off, the smaller are the chances of 
its ever being introduced. 
The paper examines two areas of readjustment and possible 
reform: balanced development (the planning system) and manage-
ment of the firm (including incentives to firms and workers). 
Balanced Development Planning 
According to the post-Mao analysis the Chinese economy suffers 
from several inter- and intra-sectoral imbalances (which I have listed 
and described in the Challenge article). Here I review the latest 
information on how some of these imbalances are being put right. 
Imbalance Between the Performance of 
Industry and Agriculture 
In line with the guideline that "agriculture is the foundation of 
economic development," the following measur~s have been adopted: 
5. Yao Yilin, op. cit., p. 33. 
6. Xue Muqiao, op. cit. 
7. Next to popular cynicism, cadre immobilism ("passivity toward the four 
modernizations") remains a major problem for the readjusters. Making mistakes on the 
right, which cadres are in effect now asked to do, may be lethal for individual cadres in· 
the future, should the present regime collapse under pressure from a resurgent left, or· 
simply change its political color. 
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1. State budgetary investment in agriculture rose from 10.7 
percent of budgetary investment expenditures in 1978 to 14 percent 
in 1979. By 1985 at the latest, this proportion is to rise to "around 18 
percent." The bulk of these outlays goes to state farms and other 
state-related projects (e.g., large water conservancy and forestry 
works). State budgetary outlays on "agricultural undertakings and 
appropriations in support of the communes, production brigades and 
teams" are to rise "step by step" to about 8 percent of the state's total 
budgetary expenditures, presumably also by 1985 at the latest." In 
1979 such outlays amounted to 9 billion yuan, or 7 percent of total 
state budgetary expenditures. They were used mainly to purchase 
key industrial inputs (chemical fertilizer, machinery) and for the 
development of livestock raising and fisheries. If only direct state 
budgetary appropriations for capital construction in agriculture are 
considered, agriculture receives nowadays some 14-15 percent of total 
state budgetary expenditures on capital construction. However, such 
direct appropriations do not tell the whole story. In addition, as we 
have seen, there are sizeable allocations to the commune sector of 
additional working capital and funds earmarked for fixed capital 
construction. In 1979 these represented 17.5 percent of total state 
budgetary expenditures on capital construction. 
All in all, it would not be far wrong to say that directly and 
indirectly agriculture nowadays receives perhaps as much as one-
third of all state budgetary expenditures (direct and indirect) on 
capital construction. 
2. Agricultural Bank loans in general are expected to play a more 
important role in capital financing than they had done in the past. 
(This had also been the expectation of the Soviet readjustment 
measures of the 1960s). Agricultural loans from the state banking 
system are t_o more than double between 1980 and 1985 (Table 1 l. 
Two problems have emerged: (a) the banking authorities have 
not made adequate studies of the borrowers' creditworthiness, and (b) 
the question "how to use the minimum amount of funds to achieve 
maximum economic results" has not been resolved. The first problem 
has apparently three causes. One is that over the past thirteen years 
or so "loans for the rural areas have often been regarded as relief 
funds for distribution. . . As of the end of 1979, the country's 
8. "The Agricultural Development Programme" (Outline of Decision on Some 
Questions of Agricultural Development), approved in September 1979 by the 4th 
Plenary Session of 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Beijing 
Review, March 24, 1980, p. 17. 
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Table 1 
AGRICULTURAL BANK AND CREDIT COOPERATIVE LOANS 
TO COMMUNES AND COMMUNE MEMBERS 
(Billion yuan) 
Jan.-Sept. Jan.-Sept. Percent 
1979 1980 Increase 
Agricultural development 
and commune industry 
loans to communes, 
brigades, teams 10.2 19.84 45 
Loans to commune members 
for development of 
sideline occupations 0.34 0.66 94 
Source: Beijing Review, November 3, 1980, p. 4. 
agricultural loans which could not be reclaimed when due or overdue, 
exceeded 10 billion yuan."9 In Inner Mongolia, "out of some 54,900 
production teams which had received bank loans in the past, 43,900 
are unable to repay their loans."10 The second cause seems to be the 
continuing problem of overlap between banking and Party author-
ities, with an influential Party lobby presRing for the old egalitarian 
solutions. The third cause is that the financial cadres themselves are 
not, as of now, terribly competent. Of the country's financial cadres 
only about 25 percent. are familiar with financial work and their age 
is over 50. Only about 12 percent are professionally trained in 
financial affairs. The charge that the banking authorities fail to 
make proper studies of the effectiveness with which loans are to be 
used is somewhat weakened by the fact that the current state of 
Chinese economic science, the structure of prices, interest rates, and 
so on, do not provide an adequate foundation for such studies. 
3. State procurement prices for a number of key farm products 
have been raised and prices charged by state industrial enterprises for 
some products used by agriculture have been lowered. The idea is to 
improve agriculture's terms of trade with industry and thus help the 
commune sector's capital accumulation funds as well as raise the 
income potentially available for distribution to commune members. 
The compulsory quota purchase prices paid by the state for 18 
products were raised in the summer of 1979. The products involved 
9. Beijing Radio, Xinhua, June 17, 1980, in FBIS. June 18, 1980. 
10. Hohhot, Nei Monggol Regional Service, May 28, 1980, in FBIS, June 4, 1980. 
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were: grains, oils and fats, cotton, pigs, beef cattle, sheep and goats, 
. eggs, aquatic products, sugar beets, sugarcane, hemp, ramie, castor 
oil, silkworm cocoons, timber (in the south region) bamboo, and cattle 
hides. The national average purchasing price increases are shown in 
Table 2. 11 The policy of paying higher prices for above-quota 
deliveries of grains, edible oils, and cotton was instituted. 
Table 2 
NATIONAL AVERAGE INCREASES IN QUOTA AND ABOVE-QUOTA STATE 
PROCUREMENT PRICES OF EIGHTEEN AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS, SUMMER 1979 
Product Group 
Grains 
Oils and Fats 
Cotton 
Pigs 
Remaining 14 products 
Average for 18 products 
(Percent) 
Quota 
20 
25 
15** 
26 
20-50 
24.8 
Above-Quota* 
50 
50 
30 
Source: Renmin Ribao, October 25, 1979, p. 1, in FBIS, October 25, 1979, p. L-12. 
* On top of the quota price. 
** In north China 20 percent. The quota price was subsequently increased by 
another 10 percent. 
Ex-factory prices and marketing prices for farm machinery, 
chemical fertilizers, insecticides, plastics used in farming, and other 
industrial goods used by the farms are to be lowered gradually. A 
price reduction in these items of between 10 and 15 percent has been 
reported. 
These two measures are similar to those taken by the Soviets in 
respect to their agriculture at the time of the industrial wholesale 
11. A more detailed breakdown of procurement prices !1978, 19791 for grains and 
oils has been published in Shichang !Market News), No. 2, 1979, p. 1. It is reproduced 
in Appendix Table 14 of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, People's Republic of 
China: Agricultural Situation, Review of 1979 and Outlook for 1980 (Washington, D.C.: 
June 1980). In 1976 a survey carried out in 1,300 production teams revealed that the 
average cost plus tax of producing 100 catties !50 kilograms) of six kinds of foodgrains 
was 11.6 yuan, while the state purchasing price of thse same items was on the average 
10.75 yuan. In 1977 a survey of cotton production in 302 production brigades revealed 
that the average cost of production was 2 percent higher than the state purchasing 
price. China News Analysis <CNA), Hong Kong, No. 1178, April 11. 1980, p. 2. 
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price reforms of 1967. As in the Soviet Union, there have been some 
problems connected with relative prices. I In the Soviet Union for a 
while after the procurement price adjustments, peasants started 
massively feeding bread to their pigsl. 
It should be noted that state retail prices of grain products, edible 
oil, cotton cloth, and sugar sold to urban consumers land physically 
rationed) were to remain unchanged despite the procurement price 
hikes, while the retail prices of other agricultural products ''indis-
pensable to the masses in their daily life" (e.g., salt, vinegar, 
matches) were to remain "basically the same, " or could be changed 
only with the permission of the s• :-~te Council or of province-level 
authorities. To lighten the burden on the state of the agricultural 
subsidy, retail prices of eight food items were raised quite sharply on 
November 1, 1979 (Table 3). At the same time it was promised that 
retail prices of meat, eggs, and milk would not be raised again for 
some years and special subsidies to state sector workers and 
employees (amounting to 5 yuan per head per month) were granted.'" 
Table 3 
STATE RETAIL PRICE INCREASES FOR SOME AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS,* NOVEMBER 1, 1979 
(Percent) 
State Regulations Beijing 
Pork 33 32 
{ 33 low season 
Fresh eggs 32 22 high season 
11 hot weather seasons 
Chicken ? 35 
Source: Renmin Ribao, November 1, 1979, p. 1, in CNA, No. 1178, April11, 1980, pp. 
2-3. 
* Other products the state retail prices of which were raised: beef, mutton, milk, 
and vegetables. 
In 1979 the subsidy paid by the state to cover the increase in the 
quota delivery prices of the 18 commodities and the above-quota 
prices instituted for grains, edible oils, and cotton, amounted to 7.8 
12. The allowance applies only to state sector workers and employees, that is. to a 
small percentage of the labor force. Allowances for those working in collective sector 
enterprises are to be authorized by province-level authorities and for soldiers by the 
Central Committee's Military Committee. 
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billion yuan, or 1.3 billion yuan over the budgeted figure. In 1980 
state subsidies directly or indirectly connected with agrifulture were 
estimated by the authorities at more than 20 billion yuan or roughly 
18 percent of total budgeted state expenditures for that year. The 
rough breakdown is given in Table 4. "The total figure will be much 
bigger if subsidies for house rent, transport, and other items are 
included."13 
Table 4 
AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES, 1980 
(Billion yuan) 
Subsidized basic procurement quota prices for grain, edible oils, 
meat, eggs, vegetables, and coal for household use 
Subsidized above-quota procurement prices for grains, edible 
oils, and cotton 
Subsidy for ensuring preferential prices of the means of 
production for agricultural and industrial products which aid 
agriculture 
12 
5+ 
3 
20+ 
Source: Wang Bingqian, Report on Financial Work" to 3rd Session, 5th National 
People's Congress, Beijing Review, September 29, 1980, p.16. 
Production teams are encouraged to sell to the state any grain or 
oil they may have after fulfilling their compulsory and above-quota 
deliveries, at "negotiated" (contractual) prices directly to state food 
departments or on the "free" village fairs. The interesting thing is 
that such "first category" goods as grain and edible oils are now no 
longer subject to the state's "unified purchase," i.e., any surplus left 
over after quota and above-quota sales to the state may be disposed of 
on rural or urban fairs at market or negotiated prices. (Products 
subject to "unified purchase" by the state- e.g., cotton- cannot be 
sold by production teams at market or negotiated prices; they can be 
disposed of only within the quota and above-quota system). 14 
13. Wang Bingqian, "Report on Financial Work," Beijing Review, September 29, 
1980, p. 16. 
14. Cotton fabric which an individual may have in surplus (i.e., above his rationed 
allocation) may be sold on the urban markets. An estimated 5 million tons of 
foodgrains were traded on the free markets in 1979, in addition to oil, vegetables, 
poultry, piglets, eggs, and fruit. Fruit used to be sold under the "unified state 
purchase" system. State comm~rce was unable to cope with this, and peasants fed their 
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4. Payment for procurements. Under a new policy, production 
teams must receive from the state procurement agencies (usu?.lly 
county-level commercial departments! 80 percent of the above-quota 
price for that portion of grain delivered in excess of the summer grain 
base procurement figure. rBeginning in the summer of 1980 the grain 
base procurement figure was to be decided on at the time of the 
summer grain harvest on the basis of the figure for the whole year's 
grain procurement. l In the past production teams were obliged to 
wait until the autumn harvest for calculation and payment of the 
above-quota price for their summer grain deliveries. The measure is 
expected to (a) "increase the rev.1lving funds of communes and 
brigades for autumn production," and (bl "enable the peasants to 
increase their income because of the summer harvest 
redistribution."!.> 
5. Taxes on agriculture. Two kinds of taxes are involved: (a) the 
agricultural tax, mostly collected in the form of grain ("grain tax"l, 
and (b) commercial and industrial taxes levied on commune, brigade, 
and team commercial and industrial undertakings. 
(a) As regards the agricultural tax, the following measures have 
been adopted. (i) The tax will henceforth be "stabilized," which means 
two things: first, it will be assessed- as it always was supposed to be 
- on the "set" (that is, estimated "normal") yield of the land rather 
than - as had been the practice in the last several years - on actual 
yield; second, the tax rate will remain stable over an extended period 
of time (at least five years). This will enable the production teams to 
better plan their activities and to benefit from increases in output 
due to gains in land and labor productivity. <iil The rate of the 
agricultural tax in 1977-78 was around 5 percent of actual yield. This 
is to be reduced and the reduction is to be flexible. "You should 
consider the masses' grain ration first, before you collect grain taxes 
or buy surplus grain from them. If the situation warrants, it is all 
right if you collect only 1 percent of what they produce."1" (iiil 
apples to pigs. Since 1979 fruit can be traded on urban and village markets and state 
shops can purchase fruit directly from production teams and peasants at negotiated 
prices. Renmin Ribao, December 23. 1979, p. 2. State shops can also now purchase at 
negotiated prices a variety of other agricultural goods. However, the retail sale prices 
for these goods and for similar goods supplied by the state through its quota and 
above-quota procurements differ. The shops are not allowed to reduce the volume of 
goods sold at "ordinary" prices, i.e., at the lower state-fixed prices. However, they are 
now expected to make profits and are judged accordingly. 
15. Renmin Ribao, June 13, 1980, p. 3, in FBIS, June 23, 1980. 
16. Lhasa, Xizang Regional Broadcasting Service, June 14, 1980. in FBIS, June 
17, 1980. 
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Low-yield and grain deficit production teams are granted exemptions 
from the agricultural tax below a certain level. This exemption may 
be extended to whole regions. For example, Tibet has been exempted 
for two years (1979-80 and 1980-81) from all taxes on agriculture and 
animal husbandry. 17 In the fiscal year ending March 31, 1980 the 
agricultural tax remitted to poor production teams came to 2.35 
million tons of grain worth 746 million yuan, or about 18 percent of 
the total agricultural tax levied for the year. '8 
(b) Development of rural industries (the so-called "five-smalls") 
is to be pursued, including commune industries which are counted on 
to contribute significantly to total commune income. In line with this 
(i) the minimum level of nontaxable income from commune-, brigade-
and team-run industrial and other enterprises has been raised from 
600 yuan to 3,000 yuan, while the tax rate was left unchanged at 20 
percent. (ii) All collective agricultural, industrial, animal husbandry," 
fishery, and sideline enterprises were exempted from all taxes (except 
for industrial and commercial taxes levied on industrial products l for 
a period of three years beginning in 1980 provided that urban jobless 
youths in a single year account for 60 percent or more of the total 
number of workers and staff, and that the enterprises in question . 
adopt an independent accounting (profit and loss responsibility) 
system. Where jobless youths represent between 30 and 60 percent of 
the enterprise labor force, commercial and industrial taxes (except on 
industrial products) will be reduced by 50 percent for these three 
years. (iii) In 1979-80 existing and newly established plants and work 
teams run by rusticated urban educated youths are exempted from all 
taxes, provided they adopt an independent accounting system. 19 (iv) 
The tax holiday for newly established commune, brigade, and team 
enterprises has been extended from the former 1-2 years to 2-3 
years. (v) Newly established commune, brigade, and team enterprises 
located in minority nationality autonomous counties and border 
·counties are exempted from industrial and commercial income taxes 
for a period of five years. 
6. State purchase quotas. In fixing the amounts of compulsory 
and above-quota produce deliveries to the state, the appropriate 
17. Beijing Review, July 7, 1980, p. 4. 
18. Beijing Radio, Xinhua, July 3, 1980, in FBIS, July 7, 1980. The agricultural 
tax in 1979 amounted to roughly 4 billion yuan or 7.4 percent of all tax revenues of the 
state budget. 
19. Shenyang, Liaoning Provincial Broadcasting Service, May 27. 1980, in FBIS, 
June 5, 1980. 
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authorities have always been instructed to carefully consider the 
respective interests of the state, the collective, and the individual, in 
that order and on the theory that in the people's state these interests, 
if not always identical, are not antagonistic. Both the ranking of 
interests and the theory underlying the ranking have been modified. 
"On how to handle the relationship among the state, the collective, 
and the individual, some leading cadres said: 'In the past we 
emphasized considering the interest of the state first, the interest of 
the collective second, and the interest of the individual last.' Comrade 
Wan Li told them clearly and firmly: 'We should reverse the order. 
Individual interest comes first, follc ,•.·ed by the interests of the state 
and the collective."2" How far the rattled cadres will, in fact, follow 
the new ranking of priorities, is difficult to say. In fixing the teams' 
quota and above-quota delivery obligations, greater attention than 
hitherto is to be paid to the individual peasants' basic grain ration 
(around 140 kilograms of dehusked grain a year on the average -
"ration grain") and the teams' assessment of their accumulation fund 
needs. In order to help make the fixing of the quotas more rational 
("seek truth from facts") a nation-wide agricultural and zoning 
survey has been commissioned and should be completed within the 
next 2-3 years. Like the agricultural tax, procurement quotas are to 
be stabilized, which means that arbitrary upward changes in them 
are to be ruled out. 
The poorest production teams and areas (e.g., Tibet) and 
production teams which suffer from natural calamities and a drop in 
income are exempted from grain purchase quotas or the quotas are 
reduced according to the specific circumstances. From April 1979 
through March 1980, state purchases of grain under the compulsory 
and above quota delivery system were reduced by 2.75 million tons. 
The increase in output for 1978 and 1979 added up to 49 million tons, 
while state grain purchases in the same period rose by 8 million tons. 
The remainder was left in the hands of production teams for 
distribution to members, the accumulat;on fund, and other uses.~ 1 No 
quota or above-quota purchases shall be made from the produce of 
newly opened-up land for a five-year period, beginning from the first 
20. Lhasa, Xizang Regional Broadcasting Service, June 14. 1980. in FBIS, June 
17, 1980. Wan Li is Secretary of the Secretariat of the CPC, Central Committee. Since 
he spoke to cadres in Tibet (a poor, national minority areal the priorities were probably 
shifted around more dramatically than would have been the case had he spoken 
elsewhere in China. 
21. Beijing Review, September 15, 1980, p. 7. 
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harvest year. The proportion of surplus grains (i.e., grains remaining 
after fulfillment of the compulsory delivery quota) which must be sold 
to the state (above-quota sales) has been reduced from 90 percent to 
70 percent nationwide.22 The question of the organizational level for 
which quotas are fixed (whether for the production brigade, the 
production team, or some lower unit) is discussed later under 
"Management of the Firm." 
7. State farm profit remittances. Like other state enterpnses, 
state farms in the past had to remit all their profits to the state 
treasury. This requirement has been suspended until 1985. The 
retained profits are to be used by the state farms themselves "for 
investment and transforming themselves into amalgamated enter-
prises combining farming, industry, and commerce." The readjust-
ment is less spectacular than appears at first. Many state farms are 
still operating at a loss: one-third of them are in Jilin Province 
alone.23 Some improvement in this sense has been registered in 1979. 
That year, nation-wide, state farms showed a profit of 300 million 
yuan as against a loss of 90 million yuan the year before. The 
significance of profit and loss as indicators of farm efficiency is, 
however, questionable in the present state of prices. 
8. Other measures. (a) Although not explicitly spelled out, the 
rustication movement (xia xiang, the sending down of urban-educated 
youths to the countryside), which was both unpopular with the 
peasants (not to mention the rusticated youths) and costly to the 
production bridgades and teams that had to pick up part at least of 
the rustification tab, will be subjected to close critical scrutiny. The 
burden of the movement on the commune sector will be lessened by 
trimming the number of youths rusticated and by making quid pro 
quo arrangements between the teams-brigades accepting the youths 
and the municipalities from which the young people originate. For 
example, in return for accepting a certain number of urban-educated 
youths, suburban communes will receive priority treatment from 
city-run enterprises in the supply of hard-to-get inputs of various 
kinds. 24 
22. FBIS, January 8, 1979. 
23. Changchun, Jilin Provincial Broadcasting Service, March 13, 1980. in FBIS, 
March 31, 1980. 
24. In the past, production brigades and other rural collective units which 
accepted urban youths were given lump sum resettlement grants by the state; so much 
per youth. Later most xia xiang youths were settled on special farms, separate from 
ordinary production teams. 
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(b) Detailed administrative intervention by Party and higher-up 
governmental authorities in the production decisions of basic units 
(production teams and lower formations) is to be severely restricted. 
At the same time the respective responsibilities of Party organiza-
tions and governmental organs are to be defined with the aim of 
reducing the Party's involvement in economic detail. "We are 
correcting the practice of making no distinction between the Party 
and the government or between the government and the enterprises .. 
. . Now the Party's work is to be separated from that of the 
government."25 This is a Herculean and Augean undertaking rolled 
into one; it runs against the genetic ristory of the system, but it is to 
be given a try anyway. "From now on, when we pass on production 
plans to production teams, we should only concern ourselves with the 
state purchasing quotas of farm and sideline products. Among the 
cash crops, only the planned area under cotton is to be set aside 
according to directives from above. All the minimum areas set down 
for other crops are only for reference . . . The decision rests with the 
teams." Looking to the future more boldly: "In [the] future all 
agricultural production plans should be initiated from the grassroots 
and submitted to the higher administrative levels. Some coordination 
and readjustment can then be done down the line.""" 
(c) Requisitioning by higher-level authorities - governmental, 
Party, army- of land and buildings belonging to production teams, 
and the commandeering of team labor without proper compensation 
is forbidden. Team buildings occupied by such authorities are to be 
returned to the owners forthwith. 
Most of these various readjustments depend for their efficacy on 
the cooperation of middle echelon and lower level cadres who, as we 
have noted, exhibit a certain passivity toward the four moderniza-
tions and whose minds are, as the saying goes, in an "ossified" or 
"semi-ossified" state. 
The results of the policies aimed at restoring a measure of 
balance between the performance of agr culture and industry are said 
to be gratifying if somewhat worrisome. Industrial wage increases-
25. Hua Guofeng, "Report on the Work of the Government," <19801. op. cit .. pp. 24, 
26. "The power which should belong to the enterprises and production units is 
improperly concentrated in the government departments, that which should belong to 
the local authorities in the Central authorities, and that which should belong to the 
government departments in the Party committees." Ibid., p. 21. 
26. Zhao Ziyang, "Principles of All-Round Economic Readjustment," Eastern 
Horizon, Hong Kong, May 1980, p. 8. 
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cum-subsidy appear to have stimulated urban demand for farm 
products to the point where it surpassed the sizeable increases in 
product supply. Although the basic products are still rationed (grains, 
edible oils, cotton cloth), restrictions on their sale outside state 
channels have been relaxed. All this has exerted strong pressure on 
market prices in the cities and has predictably produced calls for 
strict administrative control over these prices. In the first half of 
1980 retail sales increased 18.5 percent over the corresponding period 
of 1979 (27 percent in the cities, 17.2 percent in rural areas); sales of 
pork, mutton, beef, poultry, eggs, and aquatic products rose by 40 
percent; and sales on village fairs by 36 percent.27 Concurrently, the 
authorities have revealed that large increases in personal savings 
(especially in urban areas) had taken place. The rate of saving is not 
known, but there is a possibility here of some involuntary saving due 
to goods shortages or improper assortment and quality - what the 
Russians euphemistically call "otlozhenny spros" (deferred demand). 
Imbalance Within Agriculture 
Agricultural imbalance concerns the overemphasis given in the 
past to grain production at the expense of other pursuits (Table 5). It 
is now admitted that the indiscriminate carrying out of the central 
command to regard grain as the "key link" caused serious ecological 
damage. 28 
Table 5 
AGRICULTURAL COMPONENTS, 1978 
(Percentage of total agricultural output value of 
145.9 billion yuan 
Crops 
Forestry 
Animal husbandry 
Sideline occupations 
Fishery 
Total 
Source: Beijing Review, January 28, 1980, p. 20. 
67.8 
3.0 
13.2 
*14.6 
1.4 
100.0 
* Including 11.7 percent from the output value of brigade-run small industries, 
but excluding the output value of commune-run industries. 
27. Beijing Review, August 25, 1980, p. 5. 
28. Vaclav Smil, "China's Environment," Current History, September 1980, pp. 
14-18, 42; Jan Prybyla, "Feeding One Billion People: Agricultural Modernization in 
China," ibid., pp. 19-23, 40-42 
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Two sets of measures are envisaged. First, the area under grain 
crops is to be reduced to less than 80 percent of total cultivable land 
and the proportion of the gross value of agricultural output accounted 
for by livestock, fishery, forestry, and sideline production is to be 
increased relatively to all crops. Second. instead of the former 
emphasis on "all-round self-contained systems" (self-sufficient com-
munes, counties and provinces) there is to be more specialization 
based on the comparative advantage of different zones and locations. 
Thus, parts of Inner Mongolia are to stress livestock breeding, for 
example, while parts of Heilongjiang are to concentrate on wheat and 
coarse grains. 
Imbalance Between Light and Heavy Industry 
From 1952 through 1974 the average annual rate of growth of 
heavy industrial production was 13 percent (16 percent for machin-
ery) while light industrial output grew at an average annual 8 
percent per annum. Between 1966 and 1978, 55 percent of total 
investment in capital construction was allocated to heavy industry; 
light industry got 5 percent. The distribution of investment within 
industry from 1953 through 1980 is shown in Table 6.. Note that 
during periods of leftist hegemony (1958-62, 1966-70, and 1971-75) ' 
the share of heavy industry was actually not all that different from 
that which it got when the right-win{VWas in charge. The bias 
appears to be built into the system. 
Table 6 
RATIOS OF INVESTMENT, LIGHT TO HEAVY INDUSTRY 
1953-57 
1958-62 
1963-65 
1966-70 
1971-75 
1976-80 
Period 
First Five-Year Plan 
Second Five-Year Plan 
Readjustment 
Third Five-Year Plan 
Fourth Five-Year Plan 
First three years of Post-Mao 
era (1979-80 expected) 
Source: Beijing Review, December 21, 1979, p. 11. 
Ratio 
1: 8.o~ 
1:10.8 
1:12.8 
1:14.1 
1:10.2 
1: 8.3 
The share of state investment allocated to light industry is to be 
increased: in 1978 it was 5.4 percent, in 1979 it came to 5.8 percent or 
some 2.3 billion yuan. In addition, light industry was allocated state 
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budgetary funds for "tapping potential" and trial-manufacturing new 
products (1.5 billion yuan in 1979). The proportion of state industrial 
investment going to light industry as against heavy is also to rise to 
somewhere around the First Five-Year Plan ratio of 1:8. A larger 
share of investment in heavy industry is to go to those projects and 
branches which turn out producer goods for light industry. Heavy 
industry itself (e.g., some sections of the defense industry) has been 
directed to manufacture more comsumer goods. In addition to 
altering the product mix of heavy industry, the development of rural 
consumer goods industries as well as household and cooperative 
sideline production are encouraged, not least by removing many 
administrative restrictions on family sideline activities and by 
providing loans to groups for the start-up of artisan-type workshops 
and service extablishments in urban areas. Cooperative arrange-
ments have been worked out between factories in the cities and 
suburban communes under which the factories help set up commune 
light industrial workshops, the factories' main contribution being 
(often discarded) equipment and technical advice, while the com-
munes supply labor and buildings. Light industry is receiving favored 
treatment in the supply of raw materials, fuel, and power. The. 
proportion of the output value of light industry to the total output 
value of industry is to rise from an estimated 44 percent in 1980 to 45 
percent in 1981. 
As a result of the several steps taken in support of light industry, 
light industry's gross output value rose by 9.6 percent in 1979 
compared with 1978, while the gross output value of heavy industry 
increased by 7.7 percent. In the first six months of 1980 the gross 
value of light industrial output rose by 24.2 percent compared with 
the same period of 1978, while heavy industrial output value 
increased by 6 percent. The attention given to promoting consumer 
goods output is, of course, related to the planners' concern about 
inflation in the setting of increases in state sector money wages and 
substantial budgetary deficits in 1979, 1980, and (expected) 1981. 
"Financially we are still operating in the red ... Growth [of light 
industrial output] lags behind increases in the people's purchasing 
power."29 
Imbalance Within Light Industry 
The problem here may be summed up as disregard of consumer 
demand ("disproportion between production and marketing"). This is 
29. Yao Yilin, op. cit., pp. 35, 37. 
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a deep-seated systemic problem traceable to the producing enter-
prises' overwhelming responsibility upward to their ministerial 
superiors rather than downward toward their customers, the tautness 
of production targets, the relative ease with which targets may be 
manipulated by enterprise managements through assortment viola-
tions and the lowering of product quality, and the absence of laterai 
contractual linkages between manufacturer and consumer which 
punishes the producer in his pocket book for persistent disregard of 
consumer preferences. That the problem is systemic and should be 
resolved by "reforms" rather than readjustments seems to be 
understood by the more theoreb·ally minded members of the 
economic leadership. Xue Muqiao clearly perceives that an effective 
solution to the problem of production losing touch with demand 
involves a movement toward "regulation by the market mechanism" 
and a reform of the price system. Incidentally, the break between 
production and user demand is not limited to light industry. 
At the planning level with which we are concerned here, the 
contradiction within light industry has been tackled primarily by 
readjusting the flow of inputs into light industry, that is, increasing 
the input volume and thus reducing the degree of plan tautness in 
the consumer goods sector. A more promising attempt at reform has 
been the granting to selected light industrial enterprises of broader 
rights with respect to direct contracting with users for the delivery of 
specified volumes and assortments of goods. This has been more 
important in the case of firms producing for foreign markets than it 
has been for firms working for domestic consumers. The subject will 
be discussed later under "Management of the Firm." 
Imbalance Within Heavy Industry 
The first problem has been the overdevelopment of the metallur-
gy and machine-building industries relative to fuel, power, raw 
materials (coking coal, ir'on ore), transportation, and building mate-
rials, especially cement. The readjustment is to concentrate on 
solving the following problems. 
(i) The technical content of domestically produced machinery is 
to be improved, largely through importation of advanced foreign 
models and processes. Many of the existing domestically produced 
machines (factory boilers, internal combustion engines, pumps, 
motors) are wasteful of material inputs and fuel consumption. (ii l In 
the past a good part of the output was produced on the bespoke tailor 
principle: there was too little standardization_, serialization, inter-
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changeability of parts, and coordination or commerce among special-
ized departments. Some of these problems were no doubt due to the 
stress put by the left on "all-round self-reliance" of economic units big 
and small. Some others are due to the nature of the system which 
makes vertical self-sufficiency (especially as regards input supply) a 
prudent thing for enterprise managements in an uncertain materials 
supply world. 
A second intra-heavy industry imbalance consists in the disprop-
ortionate stress put on heavy industry's supplying its own needs. The 
product mix, as we have seen, is to be changed, with more emphasis 
given to the production of machines used by light industry. 
The third imbalance has been between the development of basic 
and auxiliary or complementary processes within sub-branches of the 
industry and in individual factories. This has caused bottlenecks and 
erratic output performance in such industries as coal, for example. 
Balance is to be restored by increasing attention to the technical 
development of the lagging processes. 
Imbalance Between Accumulation (Investment) 
and Consumption 
The key problem here is said to be the disproportionately high 
rate of investment over the years (Table 7). 
Table 7 
INVESTMENT AS PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL INCOME 
1953-57 
1958-62 
1959-60 
1970-78 
1978 
1979 
1980 (plan) 
Period 
First Five-Year Plan 
Second Five-Year Plan 
Great Leap Forward 
Percentage 
24.2 
30.8 
"around" 40.0 
33.0 
36.5 
33.6 
"around" 30.0 
Sources: Beijing Review, December 21, 1979, p.10; September 22, 1980, p.32. 
"This lower rate of accumulation [in 1979-80] is mainly the 
result of an increase in the consumption fund for the rural and urban 
population, of limiting the scope of capital construction, and of 
economizing on the circulation fund."30 In 1979 and 1980 investment 
30. Yao Yilin, op. cit., p. 32. 
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in capital construction within and outside the state budget was held 
at 50 billion yuan. It was projected at 55 billion yuan for 1981. 
"Investment in capital construction arranged by the state has been 
reduced, while construction outlays from extra-budgetary funds 
raised by the localities and enterprises themselves, as well as various 
loans earmarked for captal construction, have increased."n In 1979, 
295 large and medium-sized investment projects were suspended or 
deferred. In 1980 a further 238 such projects were to be canceled or 
halted. In view of the urgent investment needs of certain formerly 
relatively neglected sectors and areas (e.g., education, housing, 
minority areas) as well as of defense, and because of some systemic 
problems (free budgetary allocations of capital to state-owned enter-
prises and the concurrent tendency for enerprise mangers to inflate 
their capital requirements), trimming the amount and rate of 
investment is not going to be easy. 
Imbalance Within Accumulation 
The following have been the subject of recent criticism: 
(a) Too much emphasis on investment in "productive" as against 
"nonproductive" projects, the latter comprising projects such as 
housing, public utilities, public health, education, trade, and consum-
er services of all kinds. The rate of investment in nonproductive 
projects is to be stepped up. Investments in nonproductive construc-
tion having direct bearing on the improvement of the people's 
livelihood increased from 17.4 percent of the total investment in 1978 
to 27 percent in 1979, and were expected to reach 29 percent in 
1980.32 Housing, in particular, has received priority attention. In the 
1950s urban housing received about 9 percent of total investment in 
capital construction. In the 1960s and early 1970s it was 4-7 percent. 
During the Cultural Revolution it apparently dwindled to "almost 
nothing"; it picked up to 6.9 percent in 1977, 7.8 percent in 1978, and 
about 10 percent in 1979.33 Extra-budgetary sources of funds for 
31. Wang Bingqian, op. cit., p. 17. 
32. Beijing Review, July 21, 1980, p. 15; Yao Yilin, op. cit., p. 32. 
33. China Reconstructs, September 1980, p. 11. Total investment in housing in the 
7-year period 1979-85 is scheduled to exceed the aggregate invested by the state from 
1949 through 1977. During the 1949-77 period 493 million square meters of floor space 
had been built. Between 1949 and 1978 the population of China's cities (based on data 
from 192 cities) increased by 83 percent (to reach 76.82 million in 1978, while total 
urban population in 1978 was 110 million). During the same period urban floor space 
increased by only 46.7 percent (i.e., net increase, after deducting houses pulled down). 
In other words, during that period the floor space per urban inhabitant fell by 0.9 
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residential housing construction in the cities have been increased and 
former restrictions on house-building and house-owning by indi-
viduals and voluntary collective groups have been removed. Two 
measures in particular merit attention. (i) The financial powers of 
local government authorities and enterpises have been enlarged: in 
1979, for example, the municipal authorities of 49 large and 
medium-sized cities were permitted to draw 5 percent of their 
industrial and commercial profits for urban construction, and county 
authorities were allowed to use a certain portion of the earnings of 
county-run industries for nonproductive investments. This measure 
increased the reserve funds of county and city authorities by some 2 
billion yuan. (ii) Individual industrial and commercial enterprises 
(some 4,000 of them in 1979, more in 1980) were granted the right to 
retain a portion of their profits, and to channel a part of such retained 
profits into housing construction for their workers. The total sum 
involved in 1979 was 4 billion yuan or 9.3 percent of total state 
enterprise profits transferred to the state. The state of housing (both 
the pace and quality of construction and the maintenance of 
buildings) remains unsatisfactory. In 1977 a survey of 192 cities 
showed an average floor space of just 3.6 square meters per person. In 
1979, 62.56 million square meters of floor space were added, or some 
0.3 square meters per head of urban population. 34 
(b) The second intra-investment imbalance is between project 
starts and project completions. Largely because of the tautness of the 
capital front (too many starts, too large a scale, too few key inputs) 
and probably absence of proper project balancing within the planning 
apparatus, the average length of time for an· investment project to be 
put in operation has risen sharply. During the First Five-Year Plan 
the average time span for the completion of a large industrial project 
was around 6 years. In the late 1970s it was 12 years. The remedy 
adopted has been, as we have seen, to cut down the scale and scope of 
construction and to dismantle unfinishable projects. The ratio of 
operational fixed assets to total investment increased from 7 4.3 
percent in 1978 to 83.7 percent in 1979. A longer-term remedy 
consists in the improvement of the planners' investment metho-
dology. 
(c) The efficiency of investment has also been at cause and for 
broadly similar reasons. The impression given is that careful 
square meters (not counting kitchen, lavatory, and corridor floor space). Beijing 
Review, November 30, 1979, p. 18. Most rural houses are built by individual peasants 
and are the property of households. 
34. Yao Yilin, op. cit., p. 34. 
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calculation of investment effectiveness has been the exception rather 
than the rule and that the tools for estimating such effectiveness 
have been wanting. "Initial success" has reportedly been achieved in 
the economic effectiveness of investment in both agriculture and 
industry. partly through adjusting the relationships between sectors 
of the economy, partly through enterprise consolidation, and partly 
through reforms of enterprise management. 
Balanced Development Planning: Tentative Evaluation 
The imbalances in the development of China's economy, of which 
so much has been made in recent years, have been attacked so far by 
ad hoc, fairly straightforward, rule-of-thumb measures designed to 
right the most glaring disproportions. At the same time the central 
administrative planning apparatus, which had been subjected for 
years to disruptions ranging from neglect to extreme political 
instability, is being rebuilt in terms of professional personnel, 
coverage, and improved methodology. This is, by and large, the 
centralizing component of the post-Mao readjustment, and despite 
experiments with broader rights of enterprise decision-making (to be 
discussed presently), the economy appears to be moving (thus far at 
least) in a more structured, more centralist, administrative, com-
mand direction. The number of materials balanced by the central 
authorities was 600 in the 1979 plan (60 balanced by the State 
Planning Commission, 540 by ministries). In the 1980 plan the 
number of centrally balanced materials was to rise to 800.35 The 
reaction of policy-makers to the imbalance and other economic ills 
has been to tighten up organizational lines of command and restore 
Leninist discipline. It has been overwhelmingly a reaction against 
what most of the rehabilitated administrators see as the disruptive, 
"anarchic" cellular, centrifugal leftist influence of 1966-76. There is 
still much talk about administrative "overcentralization," but it rings 
less true than do the calls for restoring structured order and 
authority. Fascination with reform of the market-decentralization 
kind is most apparent among academic economists. It is less 
noticeable, more subdued and cautious among policy-makers. The 
plan comes first; the market, second. And the plan is still envisaged 
as basically one of centrally determined materials balances and 
35. Bruce L. Reynolds, "Recent Economic Reforms in Chinese Industry." Paper 
presented at the annual meetings of the Eastern Economic Association, Montreal, May 
1980, pp. iv-v, 1-14. 
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pricing, even though the precise level of determination may be 
subject to debate. I think that when the dust settles and the 
excitement of blazing new trails after the death of Mao loses its 
novelty, the Chinese will turn to Soviet experience and the lessons of 
Soviet "reforms" of the 1960s and 1970s for instruction on how to 
modernize the old neo-Stalinist engine. 
Management of the Firm 
The intent of readjustment, it is often repeated, is to increase the 
regulating role of the market in the economy, but to keep that role 
subordinated to centralized ("unified") state planning. The enter-
prises' "rights of self-determination" are to be enlarged but only 
within limits defined by the central administrative plan. We shall 
look at this problem first from the perspective of the collective 
agricultural firm (the commune and its subdivisions), then from the 
perspective of the industrial firm. 
Agriculture 
System of Responsibility (ding bao Jiang) 
Central control over collective agriculture is exercised through 
two main channels: physical quotas (for produce delivery and acreage 
sown to different crops) and procurement prices. Some of the 
adjustments made in both these channels of control have been 
discussed earlier; the general intention was to improve the material 
condition of the farms. Here we concentrate on another aspect of the 
readjustment which is to enlarge the decision-making scope of the 
communes' lower organizational units by making changes in the level 
at which the quota procurement and prices for a given unit are 
determined, and in quota coverage, sales outside the quotas and 
income distribution. 
Officially, the rural people's commune consists of three so-called 
"levels of ownership": the commune, production brigades, and 
production teams (the last consisting on the average of between 30 
and 40 households, and very roughly corresponding to the traditional 
village neighborhood groups). Since the death of Mao and the arrest 
of the gang of four, two other still lower levels have been officially 
recognized: the work group consisting of perhaps 3 to 6 households, 
and the peasant household itself. Until recently it was insisted that 
while relatively wide powers regarding arrangements for production 
(e.g., disposition of labor, cropping patterns) within the general 
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parameters of the state-set purchase quotas and prices could be 
delegated by production teams to work groups (or even individual 
households in the economically more backward areasJ, the property 
function with respect to farm tools and other assets, and the income 
distribution function should be retained by the production teams. In 
fact, in many places the work group has become the basic production 
and accounting unit with very wide rights of use to assets nominally 
owned by the team, while in other places production, de facto asset 
ownership, and the income distribution function are now vested in 
individual households. This devolution of powers downward is known 
as the system of responsibility. Similar arrangements had been 
worked out and were widely used for three. or four years after the 
disaster of the Great Leap Forward (1958-60). By mid-1980 it was 
reported that over 80 percent of rural production teams have adopted 
variants of the responsibility system. 
The system of responsibility (based on an Anhui Province sample 
typical of some 25 percent of teams in China with responsibility 
systems) is described in the following terms:36 
Under the new system, the production team is divided into 
several groups, each embracing five or six households with 30-50 
people, of whom about a dozen are able-bodied people. The group 
which cultivates about four hectares of land signs contracts for 
fixed quotas with the production team, that is to say, it assumes 
full responsibility for carrying out the production plan and, after 
handing over to the state a certain amount of grain as agricultural 
tax, fulfilling its quotas of grain to be sold to the state and 
contributing its share to various collective reserves, it may 
distribute what is left among its members according to the 
principle of more pay for more work and of giving bonuses if the 
production quota is overfulfilled. The land, draft animals, and 
farm tools are still owned by the production team and divided 
among the groups for use. As for agricultural machinery and 
water conservancy facilities, they are still under the unified 
management of the team. 
Note that the work group is "guaranteed" the use and specific 
allocation of labor, land, tools, and other inputs in ways it thinks 
proper, so long as it supplies the team with the contracted for volume 
of produce. This contracted volume covers the agricultural tax, 
36. Beijing Review, September 15, 1980, p. 8. 
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compulsory and above-quota state procurements, and an agreed-on 
share of collective reserve contributions (capital fund, social fund). 
Anything above that is for the group to distribute as it wishes, on the 
basis of differentiated work points. In this instance the group is the 
legitimized accounting unit. But such is not invariably the case. 
An important question, of course, is how much decision-making 
discretion the groups have under the system. This will depend on the 
quota content of the contracts (including how detailed the contracts 
are) and the procurement prices set. As regards quot"<>, the majority 
top leadership sentiment seems to be that (i) "the leading organs at 
all levels should not transmit [indicators for] fixed sowing areas to 
lower levels. Under the premise of guaranteeing the fulfillment of the 
state procurement tasks, the production teams [and lower groups] 
have the right to plant crops according to local conditions."37 The 
same principle is to be extended to sideline products. "The procure-
ment quota and grain and oil prices will be assessed on the basis of 
the basic accounting unit [team, group, household] regardless of what 
production responsibility system is used in the rural area."38 This 
seems to suggest that the contract responsibilities of work groups or 
households ar-e likely to be more consistent with the groups'/ 
households' physical.and financial possibilities than they would be if 
quotas and prices were fixed in relation to the specific conditions of 
higher units. The idea is to introduce greater flexibility into the 
communes' "ownership structure" and the procurement and pricing 
responsibilities associated with it. But quota and price planning 
remain determined above the producing unit. 
In hilly, less developed, poorer, and border regions the responsi-
bility system has been carried down to the level of the individual 
household. This has been the case in Tibet, for example, where output 
quotas have been fixed for households, as well as some work groups 
and readjusted teams for a period of 2 years. Under the work 
group/individual household responsibility system, the land assigned 
to the contractor is known as the contracted plot. 
There are several variations on the theme of the contracted plot. 
For example, in some areas (Tibet is again a good example) livestock 
belonging to production teams is given over to households for raising. 
After the households have fulfilled the contractaed production quota, 
they may retain for their own use and as their own property the 
37. Guangzhou, Guangdong Provincial Broadcasting Service, June 4, 1980, in 
FBIS, June 10, 1980. 
38. Beijing Radio, Xinhua, June 2, 1980, in FBIS, June 5, 1980. 
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young livestock and livestock products remaining. In order to help 
individual households in fulfilling these contractual livestock-raising 
responsibilities, and also to help them raise pigs and poultry on their 
household (private) plots, production teams are allowed to transfer to 
households so-called "fodder plots." In some areas !especially, it would 
seem, near urban centers) production teams have established "cash 
plots," or have contracted for such cash plots with work groups or 
individual households. Cash plots are used for growing high-priced 
industrial crops that are readily marketable and are not covered by 
the state procurement plan. Another variant of the contracted plot in 
the "grain ration plot." It seems t0 be most common in underde-
veloped regions where the authorities assign responsibility for the 
production of the basic grain and oil ration to individual households, 
and allow them to keep anything over that. In effect, the responsibil-
ity system amounts to partial decollectivization which is most 
advanced in the poorest, most crisis-ridden areas. The measures 
appear to be limited and temporary, intended- like their predeces-
sor Liuist arrangements of the early 1960s- to get the countryside 
over the worst post-Cultural Revolution problems and raise labor 
productivity in the short run. 
Private Plots and Village Fairs (san zi yi bao) 
The de facto privatization of the communes' farming functions is 
in addition to the existence and, lately, liberalization of the "private" 
sector within the commune organization: the household plot, house-
hold subsidiary (handicraft) activities, and village fairs (rural "free" 
markets). The rule (how strictly enforced, it is difficult to say) is that 
private plots and contracted plots to households should not exceed 15 
percent of the production teams' farmland. 
Private plots, which were severely restricted by the left in 
1966-76, have been re-established and, indeed, granted comparatively 
wide privileges. No hard and fast restrictions are to be put on the 
land surrounding peasant houses; the peasants are to be encouraged 
to grow trees on them and the trees will be owned by the households 
that plant them. The practice of commune managements' exchanging 
good household plot land for poorer land is to cease and the better 
lands taken away from households in the past are to be returned. As 
usual, "in returning or allocating additional land, orchards, and 
livestock for personal needs, certain commune and brigade cadres 
failed to allocate them in full measure; some allocated bad or oddly 
shaped land to the commune members; and some even delayed or 
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took no action at all. In some other localities, commune members' 
sideline production has yet to be developed."39 Local authorities are 
warned not to make readjustments in the size of private plots 
according to the current population [i.e., allot so much fixed area per 
family member] since "this could only lead to blind procreation." 
There are to be no quantity restrictions on what the peasants decide 
to grow or raise on their plots so long as they fulfill their work 
attendance and manure delivery obligations to the collective.4l' 
Village fairs are encouraged. There are 36,000 of them, we are 
told, doing brisk business in eggs, fruit, piglets, and surplus edible oil 
and food grains (5 million tons of food grains were traded in 1979). 
Urban free markets for rural produce are also promoted; 2,500 of 
them have been established to date. 
More generally, the top official line now sanctions, indeed 
encourages and rewards, a "get rich" spirit by everyone, from 
individual peasant households on up. "Getting rich is nothing to be 
afraid of. Only when peasants get rich can the state become rich. 
Policy requirements should be relaxed, relaxed, and relaxed again."41 
In Rotan County, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, a meeting 
was held to find out which commune members were getting rich the. 
fastest. "One hundred and fifty commune members of the Uygur 
nationality who have actively participated in collective production 
and rapidly built up family fortunes by diligently engaging in 
household sideline production were commended and given awards by 
the county Party Committee." Representatives of some of the poor 
households who attended the meeting were reportedly "inspired and 
enlightened by the experience of the prosperous commune members. 
They vowed to free themselves of government relief and the support 
of others, and to work to achieve their own prosperity by their own 
hands."42 However, despite assurances that on this sensitive issue 
"there will be no change in the Party's policies," "the fear of becoming 
39. Beijing Radio, Xinhua, June 12, 1980, in FBIS, June 13, 1980. 
40. Guangming Ribao, June 5, 1980, p. 1, in FBIS, June 20, 1980. This was 
recommended by a meeting of Beijing economists sponsored by the Economics Institute 
of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. In Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and other places 
peasant families which previously owned no livestock can now buy such animals from 
collectives "at low prices." Beijing Radio, Xinhua, June 2, 1980, in FBIS June 4, 1980. 
41. Beijing Radio, May 30, 1980 reporting on Hu Yaobang's and Wan Li's visit to 
Tibet (Wan and Hu were respectively general secretary of the CPC Central Committee 
and vice premier of the State Council), in FBIS, June 3, 1980. 
42. Beijing Radio, Xinhua, May 29, 1980, in FBIS, June 2, 1980. 
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well-to-do has continued to prevail in certain localities."" An 
interesting sideproduct of the renewed economic man approach to the 
peasantry has been the reluctance of some team cadres to perform 
their managerial duties which, they claim, take time away from 
private plots, rural fairs, sideline activities, cash plotH, fodder plots, 
and so on. While the "blood-and-sweat school" of "braving wind and 
waves" with death-defying spirit (a Ia Dazhai and Daqingl only to 
remain modestly poor, is now decried as a leftist deviation, "incor-
rect'' consumption by cadres and masses alike is criticized.44 
It is said that as a result of these various measures, the material 
welfare of production teams has bf'<>n improved and the production 
enthusiasm of the masses has been stimulated. Average monthly per 
capita income derived from work for the collective has risen from 6.17 
yuan in 1978 to 7 yuan in 1979 (roughly 14 cents a day). Income from 
private plots and other household subsidiary activities is given as 
between 2.50 and 3.30 yuan per month for a total monthly per capita 
income of a little better than 10 yuan ($6.00). The cooperatively 
derived income includes the equally shared foodgrain ration, which 
works out at roughly 12 kilograms a month, plus differentiated work 
points income. Commune revenues in 1979 rose by 11.4 percent, and 
the gross value of agricultural output by 8.7 percent.45 On the other 
hand, in the new spirit of seeking truth from facts, the People's Daily 
noted in its editorial of May 14, 1980, that "in some parts of the 
country containing in all 100 million people, there has never been a 
good life since the collectivization [1955] and production has not 
picked up since the three years of economic collapse [1959-61]. In 
these regions the population has increased but the amount of grain 
has not increased. . . . The peasants have lost their faith in 
collecti vization."46 
43. Beijing Radio, Xinhua, June 12, 1980, in FBIS, June 13, 1980. In the past, 
" .. 'rich' was as fearsome as a tiger. No one dared to become outstanding. Everyone 
was willing to be backward and proud of being poor." Renmin Ribao, May 16, 1980, p. 
5, in FBIS, May 22, 1980. 
44. Some cadres and peasants have begun to spend "lavishly" on astrologers, 
geomancers, Taoist priests, funerals, and weddings. See Changsha, Hunan Provincial 
Broadcasting Service, April 6, 1980, in FBIS, April 29, 1980 on funerals, and Beijing 
Radio, Xinhua, .April 26, 1980, in FBIS, April 29, 1980 on "the growing tendency to 
overspend on weddings." 
45. State Planning Commission, Beijing Review, April 21, 1980, p. 17; Beijing 
Radio, Xinhua, June 16, 1980. Renmin Ribao, November 26, 1978 mentions a county in 
the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Regin where the peasants' monthly income from the 
collective economy came to 2.42 yuan ($1.45 a month or 5 cents a day). 
46. Renmin Ribao, May 14, 1980, p. 1, in CNA, No. 1182 (1980), p. 7. 
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Commune Corporations 
An interesting experiment was initiated by a people's commune 
in Shandong Province in the spring of 1980. The commune estab-
lished a corporation for the production of sake and soybean sauce and 
the operation of a flour mill. It issued 1,250 shares of stock at a par 
value of 100 yuan. The shares were sold to various groups as well as 
to commune members. A shareholders' representative meeting - the 
highest decision-making body in the corporation - is held four times 
a year to discuss and review management policy and elect the 
corporation's "director general" and plant supervisors.The meeting 
also approves or disapproves recommendations on hiring and ter-
mination policies of the management. Of the profits, roughly 60 
percent are distributed among the stockholders as "income without 
labor," 20 percent go for current expenses, and the remainder for the 
accumulation fund. The corporation is a manifestation of the current 
leadership policy of encouraging private investments in certain 
deficiency areas as a supplement to investments by the state. 47 
Industry 
As in agriculture, industrial readjustment resolves itself into two 
main components: incentives to firms (more presisely, to firm 
managements) and incentives to individual employees of the firms 
(workers and staff). 
Incentives to Firms 
Incentives to firms are seen primarily as: (a) enlargement of the 
decision-making powers of enterprise managements; (b) rationaliza-
tion of the industrial structure; and, (c) introduction of economic 
legislation. 
(a) Enterprise Decision-Making Powers 
So far measures taken or actively under consideration with 
regard to greater enterprise autonomy have been confined to 
enlarging the managers' discretionary powers outside the state plan, 
that is, once the main plan indicators set for the enterprise by the 
planners have been fulfilled; or "market regulation under the 
guidance of the state plan." There is nothing very reformist about 
that, and the Chinese- as of now- have not traveled in this area 
as far as the Soviets had in the 1960s. The impression of startling 
47. Tokyo, Kyodo, June 30, 1980, in FBIS, June 30, 1980. 
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change that one gains from reading about the adjustments China's 
economy since 1976 arises partly because dter years of everything 
having been quiet on the economic theory front (when such concepts 
as profit could not even be mentioned), there is now a great deal of 
running about in the trenches. Workers in science and education 
(including academic economists), unlike workers in factories, have 
not so far benefited from wage increases. Their major compensation 
seems to be their present ability to speculate boldly on possible 
economic reforms. But their reformist schemes are well ahead of 
actual reform measures. Expanding managerial discretionary powers 
under the guidance of the state plan means several things that may 
be listed as follows: 
• Profit retention by enterprises and the underlying problem of 
price determination. 
• Depreciation allowances and the general question of enter-
prise capital investment financing. 
• Lateral contracting for purchases and sales, including the 
hiring and dismissal of labor. 
• Direct access to foreign buyers and sellers. 
• Profit retention and pricing. In the past all profits of state 
enterprises were transferred to the state treasury (and, at the other 
end, all the enterprises' capital needs - as defined by the state 
planners - were met from interest-free state budgetary appropria-
tions). Despite three major administrative decentralizations (1958, 
1964, 1970) "enterprises were all along run by administrative means. 
Enterprises never had the power to act on their own but could only 
handle their affairs according to the state plan and the directives and 
rules received from the [imperfectly coordinated and overlapping] 
administrative organs above."48 Much of the present technical 
backwardness of Chinese enterprises is attributed to this inability of 
enterprises to engage in "expanded reproduction" on their own and 
from their own sources. 
The Sichuan and other experiments in enterprise readjustment 
allow state enterprises (some 6,600 of them in 1980) to retain part of 
their profits. In 1981 all state sector enterprises will be so treated. 
There are two approaches to profit retention. In some cases a portion 
of the total actual profit (planned and over-plan) is retained by the 
48. "Changes in China's Economic Management," Beijing Review, February 4, 
1980, p. 22. 
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firm, i.e., a fixed percentage of the whole lot. In other cases a 
percentage of above-plan profit is retained, while planned profits are 
either transferred to the state in their entirety, or only a small 
percentage of them is kept by the enterprise. In the case of the 
Daqing oilfield and some other state enterprises, up to 10 percent of 
above-plan profits may be retained, not a great deal. The retained 
profits are channeled into a number of enterprise funds in accordance 
with centrally prescribed formulae. There are three such funds: a 
bonus fund (the bonus being distributed to managerial, administra-
tive, and production workers), and funds for outside-plan capital 
construction and for the social welfare of the employees. Allocation of 
retained profits to these funds varies, as does the pattern of 
distribution from the funds (both regulated by central guidelines). In 
Daqing and some other places, about 30 percent of the retained 
above-plan profits have gone for bonuses, the remainder into the 
other two funds. Xue Muqiao, whose position on this question has 
undergone change in recent months, once believed that the system 
would enable the "advanced" (profitable) enterprises to make rapid 
progress, while "the backward ones which have less funds [would] 
make slower progress." (He suggested that the gap could be narrowed . 
by short-term bank loans which the laggards would have to repay out 
of subsequently earned profits.)49 It should be noted that all after-tax 
profits of collective sector enterprises are retained by the enterprises 
and are distributed among the firms' accumulation and social funds, 
and as payment to members. 
Three problems have "cropped up" in this connection. First, there 
is an ongoing wrangle between "the interests of the state, the 
collective, and the individual": the respective macro and micro 
interests do not mesh well, if at all. In February 1980 the State 
Economic Commission felt obliged to issue again a directive remind-
ing all concerned that "under no circumstances should [enterprises] 
rely merely on increasing profits reserved for themselves." The 
second problem is more basic and more difficult to settle. It concerns 
the meaningfulness (opportunity cost accuracy) of the pricing process 
of which profits are one expression. 
Simply stated the problem is this. Prices in China - with the 
exception of fairly competitive prices on the 36,000 rural and 2,500 
urban-suburban fairs - are fixed by the state at various levels. The 
49. Xue Muqiao, "On Reforming the Economic Management System (II)," Beijing 
Review, March 24, 1980, pp. 22-23. See also parts I and III of the series in ibid., 
February 4, 1980, pp. 16-21, and April 7, 1980, pp. 20-26. 
READJUSTMENT AND REFORM rN THE CHINESE EcoNOMY 31 
state-set prices can only be changed by the appropriate state organs. 
The prices are based on an average branch cost-plus formula. This 
covers the average branch cost of materials ((including fuel and 
power), depreciation of plant and equipment, and direct and indirect 
labor, plus an average branch profit markup and (commercial or 
industrial) tax. Missing from the costing process are the costs of 
capital and land used in production, i.e., rate of capital cost and rent 
for the use of natural resources. As in the pre-reform 1967 Soviet 
experience, this pricing procedure tends to understate actual produc-
tion costs (especially if the planners' cost figures are adjusted to take 
account of projected - and probably overly optimistic - cost 
reductions due to centrally planned technological innovation). Pro-
duct prices (both at the wholesale and retail levels) are not very 
reliable pointers to relative scarcities and utilities in the system (the 
"plus" components of profit margin and tax or subsidy being often 
hit-and-miss affairs). Prices not being reliable guides to optimal 
allocative action, it follows that the new emphasis on profits as 
indicators of enterprise progressiveness may be misguided and that 
profit-sharing by itself is not the whole answer but, in fact, is perhaps 
an incorrect answer to the ills that beset enterprise performance. On 
mature reflection, Xue Muqiao describes the dilemma in Marxist 
terminology:50 
"Our previous practice of expanding enterprises' self-
determination rights was primarily a practice of profit-sharing. 
It was also intended to use the distribution of profits to stimulate 
the enterprises' enthusiasm to improve their management . . . 
But today the prices and values of various kinds of products are 
vastly different and an enterprise's profits are determined by low 
or high prices and not by management [i.e., the problem resides 
more in the system than in the lack of managerial expertise.] 
The phenomenon of inequality has consequently appeared in the 
sharing of profits among various enterprises. The fundamental 
way to resolve this question lies in adjusting prices. Adjusting 
prices, however, is a very complicated task that cannot be 
accomplished for the time being. Hence we have adopted the 
current method of determining the profit-sharing ratio by the 
amount of profits earned, in order to reduce inequality in 
distribution. However, the adoption of this method has become a 
50. Xue Muqiao, "Some Opinions on .Reforming the Economic System," Renmin 
Ribao, June 10, 1980, in FBIS, June 25, 1980. 
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stumbling block to future price adjustments. Any price adjust-
ment is bound to affect the amount of profits shared between the 
state and the enterprises, If the price is adjusted upward, state 
revenue will suffer; if the price is adjusted downward, enterprises 
will suffer. To avoid favoring either side, we have used the old 
price prior to the adjustment, as a basis for profits-sharing. This 
· method not only involves complicated computations, but also 
tends to arouse endless controversies. Furthermore, price adjust- . 
ments will not be able to regulate supply and demand. An 
upward price adjustment will not make enterprises produce more 
goods that are in short supply, because enterprises are not going 
to get a bigger share of the profits. Likewise, a downward price 
adjustment will not make the enterprises produce fewer of the 
goods that are in excessive supply' because they are going to get 
the same share of profits anyway. In short, reforming the· 
economic system by changing the profit distribution methods 
contradicts our efforts to use the regulatory functions of the 
market to avoid disruptions between production and demand. 
To date there has been neither a general price recalculation ori 
the Soviet model of 1967 (i.e., a nationwide recomputation of 
industrial wholesale prices that would produce more accurate cost of 
production figures by including a charge ori capital and differential 
rent), nor has there been any noticeable freeing -of prices from central 
control. Thez:-e have only been increases in agricultural procurement 
prices for some products, selective increases in nonstaple food prices 
at retail, and selective wage adjustments. Spontaneous illegal price 
(including wage) increases are common and have been dealt 
with administratively by all sorts of price inspection procedures 
carried out by governmental and Party organs.51 The profit-sharing 
51. "The salient problem at present is indiscriminate and covert price hikes." 
Hanghou, Zhejiang Provincial Broadcasting Service, May 1, 1980, in FBIS, May 2, 
1980. Beginning April 1, 1980 interest rates on savings qeposits were raised as follows: 
Deposit Old Rate New Rate 
(percent per month) 
1 year 0.33 0.45 
3 ytars 0.375 0.51 
5 years 0.42 0.5·7 
Renmin Ribao, March 27, 1980, p. 1. In Heilongjiang PrOvince, in the fall of 1979, 
11,000 enterprises and 1.8 million prices were investigated. In Shanghai 20 percent-of 
state-owned food shops had illegally raised prices. CNA, No. 1178,_Aprilll, 1980. 
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readjustment based on understated cost figures and fairly arbitrarily 
set product prices will nonetheless be expanded in 1981 to cover all 
state-owned enterprises in industry, communications, commerce, and 
elsewhere. 
The third problem relating to profit retention is a legacy of 
China's egalitarian exercises during the tenure in power of the 
leftists. Instances have been cited of the retainable profits of 
profitable enterprises being pooled and distributed among all enter-
prises in the given administratively defined area. 
There is talk, some of it in high places, of replacing the 
profit-sharing experiment with taxe~. The idea seems to be catching 
on. In his report on the 1980 and 1981 economic plans, Yao Yilin, 
minister in charge of the State Planning Commission, noted that 
"beginning from 1981 ... we shall extend to more state-owned 
enterprises the experimental changeover from the transfer of profits 
to the state to a tax on profits." It is also proposed to "try out 
collecting fees from state-owned enterprises for the use of fixed funds 
so as to promote rational use of state assets" (introduction of a capital 
charge a la the USSR) and to "impose regulatory taxes and taxes on 
natural resources" (also a current Soviet practice).52 It is difficult to 
say at this time whether all this signals an impending Soviet-type 
industrial wholesale price readjustment or portends reformist Hunga-
rian-type measures that would give more "spontaneously generated" 
flexibility to the price system. 
• Depreciation allowance rates are set by the state planners. 
There are several proposals on the books at the present time 
regarding the treatment of depreciation and its link to enterprise 
investments. Like their Soviet counterparts, Chinese economists by 
and large agree that the rate of depreciation is too low and that it 
should be raised if only to make production cost calculations more 
realistic. As for the remission of the depreciation charge to the state 
(100 percent remission is the rule outside pilot firms), the outcome of 
the present debate cannot be readily. predicted. There is fairly 
widespread agreement that at least a portion of the allowance chould 
be retained by the enterprises and used to feed the enterprise capital 
construction fund. The controversy centers on the question whether 
such retention should be accompanied by a continuing interest-free 
government budgetary capital appropriations for the enterprises. 
Some argue that the state should put a charge on the enterprises' use 
of capital granted from the state budget but allow the enterprises to 
52. Yao Yilin, op. cit., p. 42. 
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retain a portion of the depreciation reserves. Others urge abolishing 
the system of free budgetary appropriations and. replacing it with 
interest-bearing bank loans to enterprises. In this case enterprises 
would be allowed to keep all their depreciation reserves. 53 I think the 
most likely combination in the near future, at least for the majority 
of state enterprises, is partial depreciation reserve retention plus 
capital charge. It should be noted that collective sector enterprises 
retain all of their depreciation reserves, at least according to the 
rules set down. 
• Lateral contracting for the purchase of inputs, the sale of a 
portion of outputs, and - increasingly - labor recruitment is a 
common practice for collective sector enterprises of all kinds. Only a 
relatively small proportion of inputs is supplied to such firms by the 
state at state-fi?Ced prices. The collectives have to fend for themselves 
in this matter and they are expected to find their materials and other 
inputs locally in sources not used by the state· (i.e., they should not 
compete with the government sector for inputs). The bulk of collective 
firms' output of the more important products is _sold to the state 
commercial network; the rest is sold by contract to individual 
factories. or state authorities at negotiateq prices, or on the market .. 
·Labor is allocated to collective enterprises by the state's labor 
bureaus, or nowadays· may be hired directly fro in among the 
unemployed or those who are not assigned jobs by state labor bureaus 
(e.g., those who are not among the top in the graduating classes of 
vocational, agricultural, and technical middle schools). Increasingly, 
assignment of workers by labor bureaus involves competitive profes-
sional/vocational examinations. In these three respects (input supply, 
output marketing, labor recruitment) collective enterprises have, at 
least on the theoretical surface, more discretionary power than state 
enterprises which (except for those undergoing readjustment experi-
ments) receive their inputs an:d labor.from, and sell the greater part 
of their output to, the state at state-fixed prices. However, post-Mao 
analysis has revealed far-reaching discrimination against nonagri-
cultural collective enterprises (also against production teams in the 
rural commune sector) under all three headings and some more (like 
pay scales, social benefits, and working conditions). The state plan 
comes first, and it all but uses up the available supply of materials, 
53. These alternatives are discussed by S. H. Chou in "Some Observations on 
Managerial Reforms in the PRC." A· paper presented at the 1980 Conference of the 
Mid-Atlantic Region Association for Asian Studies, Drew University, October 25, 1980, 
pp. 14-16. 
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and all kinds of persuasive pressures have been put on collectives to 
sell most of their output to the state at not overly attractive prices. 
The labor supply of collective firms consists in large part of 
housewives, retired people, unskilled youth and others who cannot 
find jobs in the state sector. 
What seems to be happening under the pilot readjustment 
experiments may be described as a "collectivization" of state enter-
prises. This is brought out by the discussion relating to profit and 
depreciation reserve retention, bank financing of at least a part of the 
state enterprises' fixed captital needs, the insistent calls on state 
firms to operate in the black with cnncurrent threats of withdrawing 
state budgetary subsidies for enterprises which persistently make 
losses, and the permission now given to state enterprises to contract 
for inputs and outputs with other enterprises once the state plan has 
been fulfilled. There has also been a good deal of discussion, but so far 
little action, on how to break the "unbreakable iron rice bowl," that 
is, how to get around the principle of guaranteed life-time employ-
ment in state enterprises. (An offspring of a retired state sector 
worker is entitled to a job in the same factory.) The number of 
mandatory targets set by the planners for state enterprises is to be 
gradually reduced. This in itself would not amount to much, as Soviet 
experience of the 1960s has shown. However, the intention at least is 
to accompany the reduction in mandatory targets with increased 
resort to "economic levers" to give "guidance to the enterprise." It is 
not clear, perhaps even to the readjusters themselves, what these 
economic levers will be in the absence of a flexible price system. 
There is talk about reducing tautness in the economy by making 
output targets more reasonable relatively to the available inputs: 
"The argument of fulfilling 100 percent of a task with 70 or 80 
percent of the materials needed is nonscientific." This way of 
proceeding leaves "gaps" in the plan. Although "some hold that gaps 
constitute an inpetus," that is, a taut plan is a surrogate for market 
competition by keeping managers on their toes (but it also makes 
them cheat), most people now realize that "the bigger the gaps, the 
more serious the harm."54 As was the case in the Soviet Union, there 
is a declared intent to increase the distribution of the means of 
production through "commercial" channels, perhaps to partially 
dismantle the material-technical supply network. But there is 
considerable hesitation and uncertainty about taking this step. Xue 
Muqiao puts it bluntly: "In future reform of the economic system, 
54. Renmin Ribao, June 16, 1980, p. 1, in FBIS, June 20, 1980. 
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reforming the commodity circulation system to invigorate our 
economy seems to be more important than reforming the profit 
distribution system. This point, however, is generally ignored . . . 
Increase the circulation channels, reduce circulation linkages, and 
make it possible for producers and consumers to meet directly."5" 
• Direct access to foreign buyers and sellers by selected enter-
prises has been introduced, especially in Guangdong and Fujian 
Provinces. In a number of instances representatives of individual 
enterprises have taken part in negotiations with foreign businessmen 
and foreign governmental negotiators. Some pilot firms have been 
granted the right to retain and dispose of a part of the foreign 
exchange income earned through their firms' exports. Such lateral 
activities by enterprises are, of course, subject to various controls by 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of 
China, and various special foreign exchange commissions. The most 
spectacular lateral contact between Chinese and foreign enterprises 
is the joint venture, which can only be mentioned here in passing. 
There are many legal and administrative problems that must be 
hammered out before joint ventures with foreign corporations take on 
substantial proportions. So far the arrangements that have material-· 
ized have been, for the most part, joint ventures with overseas 
Chinese, especially Hong Kong corporations. A number of special 
economic zones and industrial districts geared to the export trade 
have been set up in Guangdong and Fujian. These are patterned on 
the export processing zones which once played a key role in the 
development of Taiwan's exports. 
To sum up, decision-making powers of the 6,600 pilot enterprises 
have been widened under the four headings discussed above, but 
there remain strict state-set limitations on the exercise of the newly 
acquired powers. 
(b) Rationalizing the Industrial Structure 
The following measures are being taken to "tap the potential" of 
existing enterprises (mainly reduce the underemployment of labor 
and capital): 
• Consolidation, specialization, and cooperation of firms. 
• Interfirm competition. 
• Expansion of the collective and family private enterprise 
sectors. 
55. Xue Muqiao, Renmin Ribao, June 10, 1980, in FBIS, June 25, 1980. 
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• Consolidation, specialization, and cooperation of firms has 
already been mentioned in connection with our discussion of the 
reorganization of the machine-building industry. The basic issues are 
these: The administrative command system resting on the adminis-
tratively defined branch principle of planning promotes the emerg-
ence of independent ministerial empires, a bureaucratic compartmen-
talization of independent ministerial empires, a bureaucratic com-
partmentalization of the economy along industrial branches, enter-
prise, and politically drawn regional lines. In addition, the Maoist 
insistence on "self-contained systems" - regional and functional -
aggravates the system's natural propensity toward duplication, 
concealment of "reserves" by each and every enterprise and branch, 
and deficient lateral micro coordination. Another legacy of Maoism is 
the proliferation of mini-industries, some of which are wasteful and 
do (in fact, although they are not supposed to) compete with state 
firms for scarce inputs of all kinds. Consolidation or outright 
elimination of such firms has been a constant feature of periods 
during which a politically emergent Party right cleans up the 
problems left by an outburst of radical left policies (e.g., the 
cleaning-up operation carried out in the wake of Mao's Great Leap 
Forward, from 1961 to 1963). The leftists "did not care about the 
conditions, never worked out the costs, and set up the 'five small' 
industries. The damage and waste as a result of such impractical 
ways are gigantic and frightening ... [We] must break through the 
old notion that every place should build an independent economic 
system for itself."56 The sentiment is laudable but the theoretical 
building blocks for its implementation (correct costing procedures, for 
example) are scarce at this point in time. The need for calculating 
opportunity costs is understood by the present leaders and more so by 
their academic advisers. But such calculation is inhibited by the 
present condition of Chinese economic science and the state of 
Chinese prices. 
The present drive for consolidation of the less viable smaller 
enterprises, specialization, and cooperation covers all sectors of the 
economy, industry as well as agriculture. The essence of the effort is 
to break through administrative barriers and allow the emergence of 
the economic "inner ties" among enterprises, sectors, and areas. 
Consolidation, specialization, and cooperation take three main 
forms. (1) Establishment of domestic joint ventures based on division 
of labor and technological levels among the associated enterprises. 
56. Renmin Ribao, June 10, 1980, in FBIS, June 19, 1980. 
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For example, Shanghai Municipality runs a number of joint light 
industrial ventures with Zhejiang, Jiangxi, and Hunan Provinces and 
the Guangxi Autonomous Region. Technology and funds are provided 
by Shanghai; manpower and raw materials by the partners. (2) There 
has also been a movement toward the establishment of specialized 
nationwide companies equipped with independent self-accounting , 
(khozraschet) systems. These are in essence subministries, operating 
on the (Soviet-type) self-accounting system. The system has also been 
applied to domestic wholesale commerce. A nationwide chemical 
product sales network has been set up in which 14 cities participate 
for the exchange of information, resolution of surplus and shortage 
problems, and the conclusion of contracts. (3) There is a trend toward 
setting-up multiplant enterprises under single management (roughly 
the equivalent of the Soviet production associations of the 1970s). 
• Interfirm competition, as distinct from interfirm socialist 
emulation, is considered to be deficient. The problem is rooted in the 
principles of guaranteed employment and the (now discarded) 
equalitarianism of interfirm income distribution, the policy man-
ifestation of which has been the immortality of socialist enterprises, 
at least of those owned by the state. "Extensive competition is to be 
encouraged under the guidance of the state plan." (Note the 
qualification: "blind," "spontaneous" market-type competition will 
not be allowed). Xue argues that competition might enlarge the 
economic differences between people. "Actually these differences 
constitute a motive force that encourages the advanced and stimu-
lates the backward. Then the question arises as to whether a large 
number of medium-sized and small enterprises will go bankrupt. I 
think this can be avoided by encouraging integration."57 
In short, the new approach to interfirm competition rejects, at 
least at the rhetorical and academic levels, the old thesis that 
administratively created plan tautness (asking for more than can be 
delivered) is a way of competing superi()r to the anarchic competition 
of the market. However, given the powerful (and, since 1976, 
reinforced) concrete structure of the economy's administrative appar-
atus and the worrisome unemployment problem, the likelihood of 
interfirm competition being actually practised in the near or not so 
near future on any significant scale is, I think, exceedingly slim. 
• Expansion of collective and family (private) enterprises in 
urban and rural areas is now encouraged as a quick and relatively 
cheap way of soaking up some of the urban unemployment (especially 
57. Xue Muqiao, Beijing Review, September 8, 1980, pp. 21-22. 
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among the young), supplying badly needed services to the 
population,'" and providing additional income to peasant families and 
nonfarming employment to rusticated urban educated youths. The 
new collective or family-type private firms are established semi-
spontaneously by individuals and groups in response to market needs 
as perceived by them, and with marginal financial help (or at least 
absence of harassment) from the state.59 Newly established commer-
cial and service trade enterprises run by collectives are exempted 
from industrial and commercial taxes and income taxes for 3 years 
from the month they begin operations, except for industrial and 
commercial taxes levied on industrial products. Beginning in 1980, 
commercial and service trade enterprise pay their income taxes 
according to the collective industrial tax rate, which is expected to 
lighten their tax burden by about one-third. There is probably 
ambivalence about this policy at the echelon of local state and Party_ 
authorities, judging by frequent complaints about runaway "exploita-
tive" and other "unhealthy" tendencies among the masses. 
Capital investment in collective enterprises is relatively modest, 
recoupment periods are short, and labor intensity is high. The 
average per capita fixed investment in all state sector and other 
enterprises is shown in Table 8. 
Table 8 
AVERAGE PER CAPITA FIXED INVESTMENT, MID-1980 
(Yuan) 
Sector 
All state sector enterprises 
State light industry 
State heavy industry 
Collective enterprises 
Yuan 
10,000 
6,200 
12,000 
less than 2,000 
Source: Beijing Radio, Xinhua, June 18, 1980, in FBIS June 20, 1980. 
58. In 1957 there were 10 retail shops per 1,000 persons; in 1979 there was only 1 
retail shop per 10,000 persons. There were about 1 million shops in the country in 
1957; in 1979 there were only 190,000 shops. Many of the shops have no storage space, 
i.e., goods are stored out in the open. Renmin Ribao, February 15, 1980, p. 5, in CNA, 
No. 1178, April 11, 1980, p. 6. The number of shops in Beijing dropped from 70,000 in 
the early 1950s to 10,000 in mid-1980. "Department stores, shops, and grocery stores 
have merged, some several times, and many small trades and individual services have 
disappeared," Beijing Radio, Xinhua, May 28, 1980, in FBIS, June 2, 1980. 
59. Beijing Radio, Xinhua, June 16, 1980, in FBIS, June 18, 1980. In 1979 the 
total turnover value of one-man businesses in China was less than 1 percent of that of 
all state and collective enterprises. 
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In 1979 collective firms provided an additional 2.3 million jobs, 
almost the same as the state sector enterprises but with much more 
modest capital outlay. 
Allocation of labor to collective enterprises (as we have already 
noted) is less controlled by state labor bureaus than in the past and 
than allocation of labor to state and higher priority employments. 
The procedure nowadays, while not constituting an unencumbered 
market for collective and family enterprise labor, is comparatively 
liberal. In Beijing retired workers and unemployed young people are 
permitted to set up service businesses provided they ( 1) register at 
the local industry and commerce bureau, (2) produce a letter of 
recommendation from their neighborhood committee, (3) pass a test 
of technical competence, (4) do not propose to employ other people, 
and (5) obtain a municipal permit. 
(c) Economic Legislation 
One of the early tasks undertaken by the post-Mao leadership 
has been the reinstatement and refurbishing of laws, rules and 
regulations ("socialist legality") that took a bad beating during the 
Cultural Revolution.60 Economic legislation and economic judicial 
administrations (including arbitration) are being passed and im-
plemented. Between October 1976 and August 1980, the State· 
Council promulgated more than 40 economic decrees and is currently 
drafting another two dozen, including a draft planning law and draft 
laws governing factory work, contracts, and energy. Economic trials 
have been given wide publicity. 
Incentives to Workers and Staff 
The stress since 1977 has been on differentiated material 
incentives to individuals and groups (shifts, workshops, a factory's 
. workers as a whole). Moral incentives have not been abondoned but 
have lost much of their former position in the system. Punishments 
(material and moral) for incompetence and violations of labor 
discipline have been given more prominence than in the past. 
60. I agree with Lowell Dittmer ("The Legacy of Mao Zedong," Asian Survey, May 
1980, pp. 552-573) that the new emphasis in China on "socialist legality" is intended 
to (a) revive the awesome respect for the Party of pre-Cultural Revolution days, and 
(b) suppress dissent rather than promote individual rights, or enterprise rights for that 
matter. See Hungdah Chiu, "China's New Legal System," Current History, September 
1980, pp. 29-32, 44-45. 
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Measures taken so far to readjust the incentive system in 
industry include: 
(a) Wage and salary adjustments. 
(b) Restoration of overtime pay and, in some occupations, 
piece-work pay. 
(c) Cost of living allowance3. 
(d) Payment of bonuses. 
(el Prizes. 
(f) Restoration of seniority and professional distinctions (in-
cluding the "directorial principle"). 
(g) Restoration of trade umons (aimed, among others, at 
improving the social wage). 
(h) Measures of codetermination. 
These shall be discussed with the utmost brevity. 
(a) Wage and Salary Adjustments 
Since the fall of the gang of four, three rounds of tariff wage and 
salary adjustments have been made. (i) On October 1, 1977 tariff 
wages were raised for 46 percent of state sector industrial workers, 
employees of state enterprises, and government personnel. This was 
the first general tariff wage adjustment in twenty years. "Generally" 
the wage increase was 10 percent. An additional 18 percent of state 
sector workers and employees were moved up the job grade ladder. 
(ii) In 1978 wage increases were given to another 2 percent of state 
workers and employees. (iii) A third round of tariff wage increases 
for state sector workers and employees, this one benefiting 40 percent 
of such people, took place in November 1979. 
Several criticisms of the wage hikes have been made by the 
Chinese. First, even after the increases the level of money wages has 
remained low relatively to the prices of all but rationed staple goods 
and cotton fabric traded within state commerce. (Some of these 
articles command high prices on the village and suburban fairs.) The 
incentive effect of the wage hikes has been eroded since 1979 by 
substantial rises in most retail prices, both legally sanctioned and 
illegal. One source estimates the rise in government-set retail prices 
at 20 to 50 percent between early 1979 and early 1980. Together with 
disguised price increases, "in real life prices have gone on a 
rampage."61 Second, recognizing the material difficulties of their 
61. CNA, No. 1178, April 11, 1980, p. 1. 
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employees, many leading cadres take the "easy way out" and grant 
wholesale promotions especially "en famille." In other places in 
deciding on salary adjustments, leading cadres played factional-
favoritism and old-score-settling games. Elsewhere, they "avoided 
contradictions and surrendered their leadership" by resorting to 
secret ballots or drawing lots in deciding on wage increases and 
promotions.62 Third, large numbers of teachers, scientists and techni-
cians have not had any wage increases so far and have found their 
real incomes reduced. 
(b) Overtime Pay and Piecework Pay 
Overtime pay has been restored. Piecework pay has been 
reintroduced in certain occupations which lend themselves to it (e.g., 
loading and unloading of ships). Incidentally, piecework pay never 
played the significant role in China that it did in the Soviet Union in 
the early stages of industrialization. 
(c) Cost of Living Allowances 
As noted earlier, the increase in the state retail prices of eight 
nonstaple foods decreed on November 1, 1979, was accompanied by an 
across-the-board cost of living allowance of 5 yuan per month granted 
to all state sector workers and employees. 
(d) Bonuses 
Bonus payments to managers, workers, and enterprise employees 
have been restored and a multitude of bonus payment schemes is 
currently being tried. A preliminary treatment of the subject may be 
found in the paper by ProfessorS. H. Chou referred to earlier.63 There 
is an extensive Western literature on the subject of the effectiveness 
of bonuses in stimulating efficiency of factor inputs in centrally 
planned administrative command economies of the Soviet type, some 
of which is cited by Chou. 
Here we limit ourselves to a general description of the current 
Chinese bonus system and note some problems encountered in the 
course of its implementation. 
In general, Chinese bonus schemes are at the present time 
regarded by their authors and those who administer them as either a 
simple subsidy to what some consider to be insufficient, morale-
sapping tariff wages, or as a differentiated encouragement to 
productivity. Some bonuses are, in fact, unabashedly of the subsidy 
kind: They are paid in equal amounts to each worker of any 
62. Xining, Qinghai Provincial Broadcasting Service, May 20, 1980, in FBIS, June 
3, 1980. 
63. S. H. Chou, op. cit. 
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enterprise that has fulfilled its major planned norms, especially those 
relating to output, assortment, and profit. This practice, which began 
during the Cultural Revolution, is nowadays criticized in influential 
quarters. It is understood, however, that given the very modest 
dimensions of the current tariff wages, not much can be done about 
this rather widespread manifestation of egalitarianism. !Remember 
that it is also a form of insurance taken out by cadres against the 
eventuality of future political retribution from the left. 1 
Another argument adduced by some in favor of across-the-board 
bonuses is that the existing enterprise success indicators (centrally 
mandated norms) are "unscientific" -they are either too "soft" or do 
not accurately measure the efficiency of relative inputs of work. 
Under these conditions, the payment of differentiated bonuses would 
be likely to "impair unity among the workers." 
Also "enterprises concoct various pretP.xts to enlarge the scope of 
bonuses beyond what is justified by the bonuses' stimulus function. 
Some enterprises arbitrarily raise the level of bonuses. Some practice 
fraud and make indiscriminate use of production costs and enterprise 
funds. . . . In a word they get bonuses by violating financial and 
economic discipline."64 This has a familiar ring for those conversant 
with Soviet experience. 
In his paper, Professor Chou examines five other types of 
bonuses, not distributed equally among all workers in the firm. He 
notes that the basic characteristics of all the bonus schemes are the 
following. (i) The precondition for the payment of any bonus is the 
fulfillment of centrally planned targets; (ii) the amount of the bonus 
is calculated according to either the enterprise's wage bill, level of 
employment, or amount of over-plan profit. The most common basis 
in Chou's sample is level of employment; the least common is 
over-plan profit. 
As we have seen, Chinese sources are aware of the various 
weaknesses of the present system, especially of the controversial 
linkage between bonus and wage fund/employment, which benefits 
large employers, and those who use labor inputs lavishly. They also 
have doubts about the economic rationality of the basic targets which 
condition the bonus. 
Individual enterprise bonus formulas are supposed to conform to 
rules formulated by the central state authorities. At present this is 
probably observed mainly in the breach. There have been reminders 
64. Nanfang Ribao, May 20, 1980, in FBIS, May 27, 1980. 
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from the center that only in enterprises that were given ex-
perimentally larger powers of decision should the bonus not be 
limited to 1%-2 months average wage of workers and staff. All other 
enterprises should stay within the 11/z-2 months rule. "If they make 
big profits and want to increase bonuses beyond that, they must 
obtain permission from provincial, municipal, and district labor 
departments if they are local enterprises, or from the State Council 
departments concerned if they are enterprises directly under the 
central authorities."65 
(e) Prizes 
Cash prizes on a sliding scale have been introduced for merito-
rious performance by individuals in invention, innovation, and 
discovery of mineral deposits (and also in birth control). 
(f) Seniority, Professional Distinctions 
The old pre-Cultural Revolution principle of no-nonsense pre-
rogatives and responsibilities of the enterprise manager has been 
rehabilitated and the unruly, faction-ridden Revolutionary Commit-
tees have been dissolved. Areas of executive jurisdiction and hierar-
chical ordering are being defined and encased in rules and regula-
tions. Seniority rights are back in vogue, as is the regard paid to. 
expertise. Many scientists, technicians, and managers who were sent 
down to the factory floor have been reappointed to their former 
positions and their back salaries have been paid. Total state outlays 
under this heading are well in excess of 1 billion yuan. There 
remains, of course, the problem that those now rehabilitated lost 
expertise during their long exile on the farm or factory floor. 
(g) Trade Unions 
Trade unions of the Soviet type are back in business. They were 
abolished as "elitist" organizations during the Cultural Revolution 
and replaced at that time by all manner of mass movements 
dominated by politically alert workers. The main purposes of the 
reactivated unions are to (i) supervise labor discipline on behalf of 
the state and (ii) administer portions of the social wage and fringe 
benefits, especially with regard to work safety and general working 
conditions (both of which leave much to be desired), pensions and 
other benefits, and worker housing. Although the Constitution of the 
PRC guarantees the right to strike, the right seems to be operative 
only in times of political turmoil and the concurrent weakening of 
central authority (e.g., 1970-7~). Since 1976 attempts by worker 
65. Gongren Ribao, May 27, 1980, in FBIS, May 29,1980. 
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groups to stage "collective slow downs" and work stoppages, have 
been dealt with firmly, "according to law."6" 
(h) Codetermination 
In line with the drive to rebuild formal organizational structures 
and reimpose Leninist discipline, the fluid and fractious ''open-door" 
participatory arrangements of Cultural Revolution days have beer. 
abolished, notably the sida, or "four-bigs": darning (contending in a 
big way), dafang (airing views in a big way), dabianlun (arguing 
things out in a big way), and dazibao (big character posters). 
The sida has been replaced by formalized "enterprise democra-
cy," that is, by (i) elections of lower and middle echelon enterprise 
cadres (also of enterprise directors in a few pilot enterprises), the 
electorate consisting of all the enterprise workers or employees 
concerned, and (ii) the election of enterprise workers' congresses (a 
system which had first come into being in the 1950s but was 
suspended for 10 years during the reign of the gang). The congresses 
are supposed to have far-reaching advisory and supervisory rights 
vis-a-vis enterprise managements. 
There are some problems connected with this version of 
codetermination. First, the workers do not seem to be convinced that 
the elections are truly democratic. What happened in a local (people's 
congress) election in the Shanghai county of Fengxian is probably 
typical: ·"All the electors arrived in the hall on time with exception of 
Hu Yang and two others who stood at the door laughing 
continually .... Asked to be seated, the three tore up their ballot 
slips, while one of them added his name to the list of candidates and 
gave himself some votes at the same time. One of their superiors who 
intervened received a punch in the face, and another official had his 
arm twisted."67 It is reported that "some enterprises have held 
workers' congresses only for the sake of formality" and that there is 
opposition to them by "patriarchal" enterprise managements. The 
system "has not gained the wide attention of the masses of 
workers."66 
All in all, the current experiments in codetermination are 
probably not as effective from the standpoint of incentives to labor as 
their authors would have wished. 
66. See e.g. the incident at the Chinese Steamed Meat Dumpling and Dumpling 
Soup Department under the Shashi Eating House in Shanghai, Shanghai Radio, June 
4, 1980, in FBIS, June 5, 1980. 
67. Shanghai Wenhui Bao, cited by AFP Beijing, May 30, 1980, in FBIS, June 2, 
1980. 
68. Renmin Ribao, March 6, 1980, in FBIS, March 31, 1980. 
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Epilogue 
My survey of China's economic readjustments does not consider 
some vital issues- the economic measures taken to limit births, for 
example. At this stage it is not possible to draw firm conclusions. The 
system is in flux, the evidence is not all in, and new proposals are 
being floated all the time. The only clear indication is that so far the 
bulk of the measures taken (as distinct from proposals for measures 
to be taken) has been of the readjustment rather than the reform 
type. The cumulative effect of these readjustments has been to move 
the Chinese economy closer to its contemporary Soviet counterpart, 
always allowing for cultural idiosyncracies. An important objective of 
readjustment is to remedy some basic inter- and intra-sectoral 
disproportions and to strengthen and improve central control 
mechanisms. The expansion of enterprise decision-making powers 
has been, I think, contingent on and circumscribed by this streng-
thening and improvement of central planning. 
SUPPLEMENT AND UPDATE 
The paper was completed in October 1980. Since that time the . 
process of readjustment and reform (much readjustment, some 
reform) has proceeded space with, however, more finely tuned 
discrimination and less haste than in the euphoric early post-Mao 
years. The costs and problems involved in absorbing and paying for 
the originally (1978) proposed massive technology and capital goods 
imports are now better understood, as is the difficulty of grafting 
market-type institutions onto a centralized, administrative, command 
economy which to this day has trouble overcoming its lingering 
Maoist aversion to individual, unequal, material incentives. To lift 
the economy out of the doldrums and move it away from extensive 
toward intensive (factor-innovative) growth, the system of incentives 
must include more pay for productive workers and less pay for 
laggards, the willingness and abiltity to fire loafers and incompe-
tents, shut down factories that run only by the grace of government 
subsidies, and allow the profitable firms to keep the bulk of their 
profits and to spend them as and when and where they wish in a 
market that is not emptied of resources by the actions of the State 
Supply Bureau and its component bureaus and corporations that still 
today reach into every nook and cranny of the economy. However, as 
was noted earlier, readjustment without structural reform may prove 
to be a cure worse than the disease. In the present state of most 
Chinese prices the profitability of a firm is not even distantly an 
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indication of the firm's cost effectiveness or social utility, and wage 
levels and spreads are still too low and too narrow to elicit 
satisfactory individual effort and commitment. In the longer run (but 
not too long, or else reform will be seriously compromised by 
bureaucratic forces of special privilege and status quo) the whole 
central planning network with its baroque ministerial empires and 
administrative modes of thought may have to be pruned out of 
existence if marketization is to be more than word-deep. The present 
leaders want the country to reap the benefits of a freely operating 
"law of value" but they still recoil from the idea of dumping a system 
of central planning with which thev are familiar and which in 1979 
put 20 million tons of newly-produced steel (out of a total production 
that year of 34.4 million tons) straight into the warehouse. 
In the setting of inflation, urban unemployment, low real income 
levels, budgetary deficits, and balance of payments disequilibria, it 
takes guts made of Japanese steel to keep talking about structural 
reform which many "responsible persons" (and not only unrecon-
structed Maoists) blame for the economy's present malaise. On top of 
technical difficulties inherent in the process of early development and 
the even more elusive and politically awesome problem of institution-
al reform, there is the old factionalism within the Party (not 
improved by the show trial of the gang of four), and there is the need 
to raise public morale. Despite a widespread sense of relief that the 
Maoist nightmare is over for the time being, there is much fear of 
future political score-settling and renewed "historical transitions." 
While devotion to China is strong, a distinction is increasingly made 
- and not only in intellectual circles - between China and China's 
communist leaders. The Party's credibility has been eroded by too 
many 180 degree turns and dialectical twistings of an already 
tortuous and reason-offending line. Public goodwill and the citizens' 
willingness to make personal sacrifices on the promise of a brighter 
future, have been largely squandered and are not likely to be brought 
to life quickly by corrupt, arrogant, and self-serving cadres who 
flourish and multiply in direct ratio to the number of People's Daily 
editorials deploring their behavior. 
This SUPPLEMENT AND UPDATE follows - albeit roughly 
and with some poetic license - the conceptual guideposts of the 
original paper. 
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(March 1981) 
Balanced Development Planning 
1. The possibility of constructing a coherent long-term (five-or 
ten-year) plan has been officially ruled out for the time being until, 
that is, 1985 at the earliest. 59 Earlier plans of this nature have been 
scrapped. After 1981 and until1985 planning will be done on a yearly 
basis, "step by step," and the whole question of planning- including 
comprehensiveness and methodology- is being reexamined. 
2. While homage is paid to the principle of plan decentraliza-
tion, increased de facto privatization of property relations, and 
greater resort to market-type policy instruments ("law of value"), 
there has been so far no perceptible dismantling of the ministerial-
special commission-administrative-command edifice: the sprawling 
and immensely powerful conglomerate of bureaucratic self-interest. 
The core of the central administrative command economy (the 
economic equivalent of the Communist Party in politics) is the 
m::tterial-technical supply network headed by the State Bureau of 
Supplies, which physically apportions key producer goods, including 
most raw materials and fuels. The network appears to be thriving. It. 
employs an unhealthy half a million people at the county level and 
above, and its Beijing headquarters have a head count of 1,300. The 
Bureau's actions remain based on administrative criteria far removed 
from the inner logic of the law of value. There had been growth in the 
number of central ministries as well as some organizational con-
solidation and occasional administrative decentralization (mainly to 
the provincial level). For instance, a State Machine Building 
Commission was established under the State Council to coordinate 
the work of the various machine-building ministries. This represents 
a growing bureaucratization of the economy: additional coordinating, 
"guiding," and "assisting" organs of administration are being added 
to an already huge state and Party bureaucracy for the avowed 
purpose of bringing about a transition to more markets and less 
administration. It is a typically "Soviet" reaction to the challenge of 
economic reform. In answer to a question put to him by Western 
journalists as to whether the industrial ministries would one day be 
replaced by business corporations, vice-premier Bo Yibo (chairman of 
the State Machine Building Industry Commission) replied evasively 
that "this was not finally decided and it may take a certain amount of 
69. Zhao Zhiyan, briefing visiting Roumanian premier Illie Verdet, The Asian 
Wall Street Journal, December 30, 1980, p. 1. 
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time.";u But time in China is a scarce commodity these days, what 
with the opposition waiting eagerly around the corner and the 
people's expectations raised to a pitch. 
3. The number of material balances !disaggregated input-
output tables) prepared by the State Bureau of Supplies was 256 in 
1980. The centrally balanced ''important, commonly-used" products 
covered two major categories of producer goods: (a) fuels, raw 
materials, and other materials (e.g., coal, steel products, nonferous 
metals, wood, cement, sulfuric acid, nitric acid, soda ash, rubber, 
tires), comprising 101 items in all, and (b) machinery and electrical 
equipment (155 items), including r.nchine tools, motors, industrial 
boilers, automobiles, and bearings. Another 581 categories of goods 
known as "important means of production with specialized uses" 
(power plant equipment, for example) were balanced by central 
industrial and transportation ministries. Over 10,000 "ordinary 
means of production" were balanced by the planning organs of 
provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions. As in the Soviet 
Union this is both not enough (for comprehensive central physical 
planning) and too much (for flexibility of adjustment - material-
ordering conferences which deal with 70 percent of the balanced 
products are held once a year, and ordering meetings, which deal 
with the remaining 30 percent, are held biannually). "It is difficult," 
in the words of Li Kaixing (director of the State Bureau of Supplies), 
"to adapt to changes in production and needs, and this causes some 
units to be short of materials, while other units are overstocked.";1 
Thus, as of 1980, the central materials balancing process (central in 
the sense of being carried out above the province level) covered 837 
commodities, up 237 from the year before. Interestingly, the number 
of goods balanced by the State Bureau of Supplies rose the sharpest: 
from 60 in 1979 to 256 in 1980 (assuming that the 1979 figures given 
to Bruce Reynolds are accurate). There is talk of reducing the 
Bureau-balanced goods to 68 or "even less," but the evidence so far 
points in a contrary direction. Even a simple description of the supply 
and distribution system for key producer goods in China sounds 
incredibly complex and bureaucratic. It will take more than well-
intentioned talk to dismantle it. The centrally balanced goods (in 
fact, they are categories of goods comprising many subitems) are 
taken out of the commercial network (that is, they are unaffected by 
the "law of value") and the procedures used in determining the 
70. The China Business Review (CBRJ, November/December 1980, p. 12. 
71. CBR, November/December 1980, p. 15. 
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input-output balances and the di~tribution of inputs and outputs have 
little if anything to do with notions of market equilibria and 
optimality. In the future, according to Li, greater consideration will 
be given to market forces in determining commodity circulation. But 
this, on present evidence, amounts to mere speculation. 
4. To reduce future imbalances between what is produced and 
what is wanted in the economy, the Ministries of Light Industry and 
Commerce have conducted market surveys and, for the first time in 
more than thirty years, have come up with market forecasts. This is a 
step forward provided the underlying work is analytically sound and 
acted upon by the planners. 
5. Since 1978 another imbalance has been added to the list of 
imbalances discussed in the paper. The first budgetary deficit 
appeared in 1978. By 197.9 the government appears to have lost 
control over expenditures, thus joining the family of nations in this 
respect. In 1979 the budgetary deficit came to 17.06 billion yuan ($11 
billion), or roughly 7 percent of all budgetary revenues and expendi-
tures. In 1980 the deficit was expected to be 8 billion yuan ($5.3 
billion), but it could turn out to be higher when the final figures are 
in. For 1981 a deficit of $3.5 billion is envisaged. The imbalance has. 
been caused by lower-than-planried revenues (due in part to enter-
prise profit retentions and reductions in, or exemptions from, the 
agricultural tax - the latter will be even more significant in 1981 
because of the natural hardships visited by floods and drought on 
many communes), and by much larger expenditures than those 
planned, linked to wage increases, payment of higher agricultural 
procurement prices, outlays on imported capital goods, relief pay-
ments to communes, and expenditures on renovation of existing 
industrial and transportation enterprises. The deficits were fueled by 
an unaccustomed absence of fiscal restraint by the Ministry of 
Finance and lavish spending on capital projects by some provincial 
authorities that since 1978 had been granted relatively broad 
autonomy in this matter.· . 
Budgetary deficits have helped spur inflation, open and un-
abashed this time. The officially conceded inflation rate (retail prices 
of consumer goods) was 5.9 percent in 1979 and 6.5 percent in 1980.'2 
These figures probably understate the actual inflation rate in the 
cities, which is likely to be two to three times the official rate. In. 
addition to open inflation, there is significant and widespread 
72. Beijing, Xinhua; February 8, 1981. 
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suppressed inflation in the form of goods shortages, lines of customers 
outside stores, and "disguised" price increases ("putting fewer meat 
balls in a bowl of soup"). The authorities have reacted to all this in 
two main ways: through (a) general fiscal measures, and lb) specific 
administrative controls. 
(a) The most important general measure is the long discussed 
but now apparently imminent implemented reduction in the govern-
ment's capital expenditures, especially outlays on new industrial 
projects (particularly in metallurgy and machine building). Many of 
these projects are wasteful because the required complementary 
goods and infrastructural services are missing (e.g., electric power, 
transportation). Such cuts were to have been made gradually in 1979 
and 1980, but they were not made largely because the system as 
presently set up favors additions to capacity rather than more 
efficient use of existing capacity and improved product mix. Thus, 
while "left leaping" is criticized, the policy-makers find themselves 
forced in 1981 to command another leap-like retrenchment: an 
investment slash of 40 percent in one year, the cut being directed 
primarily at new plant and equipment in metallurgy, machine 
building, and similar heavy industry subsectors. Henceforth, invest-
ment is to be concentrated on renovation, that is, on upgrading the 
performance of existing establishments, and resources are to be 
shifted into bottleneck producer industries and services, light indus-
tries producing consumer goods, and residential housing. 
Some of the investment in consumer services is to be accom-
plished outside the state plan through the encouragement of private 
initiative. The same is true of housing. In the first ten months of 
1980, privately built housing in 111 cities and towns came to about 5 
percent of the total new floor space added during that period. 
Sichuan-type experimental state enterprises are also expected to use 
some of their newly retained profits to build workers' housing. 
However, the 40 percent reduction in ba!::iic capital construction 
by the state is bound to encounter stiff resistance. A good part of such 
investment indirectly benefits the military, who are already chafing 
at what they consider to be the scandalously low priority assigned to 
defense in the four modernizations. Direct (identifiable) military 
spending is believed to have been cut by 13 percent in 1980 compared 
with the year before. Further cutbacks in metallurgy and machine 
building, statistically classified as civilian industries but in fact of 
direct relevance to national defense, are bound to be resisted by the 
powerful military lobby. In short, pressure for raising the absolute 
amount, share, and rate of investment in basic capital construction is 
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likely to be strong in the years to come. Given the objective internal 
laws of the administrative command system and the subjective 
neo-Stalinist experience of the system's directors, the bias in favor of 
more and faster investment in the "classical" subsectors of heavy 
industry (steel, machine building) will not be easily displaced. 
The problem of inflation is compounded by two developments. 
First, industrial output (including the output of consumer goods) was 
not remarkable in 1980: about 8 percent better than in 1979. The 
goods needed to soak-up the pent-up consumer demand are not 
coming onto the market at the required pace and in the correct 
qualities and assortments. Second, agricultural production in 1980 
was affiicted by bad weather in at least two major producing 
provinces. Grain output fell 5 percent compared with 1979 (316 
million tons in 1980 against 332.1 million tons the year before), while 
the number of grain consumers rose by at least 1.2 percent (about 12 
million extra mouths to feed). Given the low per capita grain 
consumption levels in 1979, the 1980 production figures are distres-
sing. In the early months of 1981 China reportedly applied for 
international disaster relief to the United Nations (another first). 
Crop losses of 30-50% caused by floods - the worst in 26 years - and . 
the worst drought in 37 years, "seriously affected more than 20 
million people" in Hubei and Hebei Provinces (combined population: 
95 million). 73 . 
(b) Specific anti-inflation controls in China, as elsewhere, tend to 
be of the administrative-decree kind. Thus, maximum prices have 
been imposed on rural free market transactions, a measure which 
runs counter to the government's new incentives policy and does not 
square with the announced intent to let the "law of value" do more 
work in the economy. Citizens have been encouraged to inform the 
authorities of cases in which they believe themselves to have been 
short-changed by government sellers. Punishment for "disguised" 
price-raising is severe. 
6. For the first time in years, in the wake of the 1978 foreign 
shopping spree (now criticized as a "left" mistake of the leaping 
genus) China's balance of trade began to exhibit sizeable deficits 
(another imbalance to be added to the list). On the export side there 
had been excessive optimism about oil export potential. In a very few 
years oil output was expected to reach 1.5 billion barrels annually. 
Now it is thought that oil production will probably stagnate over the 
next several years, until offshore fields are tapped and technological-
73. Japan Times, February 8, 1981, p. 5. 
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ly more efficient recovery methods are applied to existing onshore 
fields. The crude oil target for 1980 (774 million barrels) was the 
same as for 1978 and 1979, and it was expected to decline by almost 
40 million barrels in 1981, and by 70 million barrels in 1982. Coal 
production is also sluggish; it has been maintained with great 
expenditure of manpower at about 600 million tons a year but is 
likely to decline in 1981. To combat the payments deficit, imports of 
plant and equipment are being sharply curtailed, a measure which 
fits into the overall retrenchment of basic capital construction. The 
cutbacks have affected Japanese suppliers the most: the postponed 
Baoshan steel project alone involvf>s contracts worth more than $1 
billion. The Chinese government has promised to compensate foreign 
firms for the losses incurred through these delays and cancellations. 
In the latter part of 1980 the government moved discreetly to 
deter imports and promote exports by introducing a separate foreign 
exchange rate for trade purposes. Beginning January 1, 1981, the 
exchange rate for foreign trade purposes was to be $1 = 2.8 yuan, 
whereas the official rate for other transactions (including tourism) is 
$1 = 1.5 yuan. The trading rate will apply to all of China's foreign 
trade corporations and other (mainly provincial) bodies doing busi-
ness abroad. The two-tier exchange rate amounts to a selective 
devaluation of the yuan; it is another example of the sort of things 
that have been practiced by the Soviets for years and tolerated by the 
industrialized countries of the West. One problem is that the new 
rate will raise the cost of China's grain and cotton imports. If this 
increase - or some of it - is passed on to the domestic consumers of 
food and clothing, it will strengthen inflationary pressures directly. If 
- as appears more likely - it is not passed on, the government's 
grain and cotton subsidies will have to be raised, and the fight 
against the budgetary deficit will become that much more onerous. In 
this case inflationary pressures would be strengthened indirectly. 
7. Not much progress has been made so far in getting the Party 
out of economics, or at least out of economic minutiae. The respective 
areas of primary responsibility of the government and the Party 
remain blurred, with the Party butting-in at every turn and level of 
decisions. Recent articles insist that, whatever may have happened in 
the past, the division of labor between government and Party will be 
implemented from now on. However, the proposed implementation 
raises legitimate doubts about the outcome. It is promised that "with 
the introduction of division of work between the Party and the 
government, Party leadership will be strengthened."'4 
74. Beijing Review, January 12, 1981, pp. 5-6. 
54 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
Management of the Firm 
1. Pricing. As noted before, in the absence of fairly competitive, 
flexible, and largely self-regulating prices (not limited to baskets, 
toys, bamboo whistles, and home-made soup) the so-called "Sichuan 
model" of profit orientation, profit retention, and self-accountability 
by state sector enterprises cannot indicate to either managers or 
planners the efficiency of enterprise operations, nor can it put an end 
to the divergence between the interests of the firm and the interest of 
the community as perceived by the planners. So far there has been no 
detectible drift toward free prices, with the exception of prices on 
rural fairs, which merely amounts to a restoration (and even these 
prices, as we have seen, are monitored and being interfered with by 
government authorities), prices of some consumer services in urban 
areas (food served in privately run restaurants, clothing and shoe 
repairs, tailoring, haircuts), and prices of home-made handicraft 
products. In a few cases the prices of above-quota traded commodities 
have been allowed to float between centrally approved limits (e.g., 
steel products sold directly by a few experimental mills). While such 
limited price liberalization no doubt adds to the material welfare of 
the consumers of dumplings and basketry, it can hardly be described 
as of historic significance. 
There is talk in highly placed circles about moving one day 
toward a Hungarian-type three-tiered price system. Under this 
arrangement the prices of key inputs and outputs would be regulated 
by the planners in accordance with improved production cost 
computations (the planners would also determine what is key and 
what is not). Some prices of "less important" products would be 
designated as "limit"· prices, that is, they would be allowed to 
fluctuate within a certain range in response to changes in cost and 
demand conditions. The remaining prices would be free to move 
without any restrictions whatsoever. The reform would be accompa-
nied by a reduction in the number of goods allocated outside the 
commercial network through the material-technical supply empire 
and introduction of at least some contractual commercial relations 
between the Supply Bureau and individual enterprises. It is difficult 
to say at this point how seriously such steps are being considered. If 
implemented, they would represent a shift in the direction of 
economic, as distinct from administrative, decentralization; i.e., they 
would amount to changing the system quite a bit, as they did in 
Hungary. However, it is unlikely that a dismantling of the material-
technical supply network and of its parent planning apparatus is 
seriously contemplated at this time. The Hungarian reforms have 
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shown that partial remedies do not get rid of the misallocations, 
rigidities, and delays that beset the central administrative planning 
model. In fact, the very patchiness of the remedies invites invidious 
comparisons by those opposed to any and all reform and produces an 
almost certain recentralization and a return to the old administrative 
monster. When strategic materials are bureaucratically controlled 
and priced, the sphere of market operations is restricted and 
distorted, and the market principle is compromised. 
2. Enterprise Autonomy. Experimentation with marketization 
<within an overall environment of state monopoly and state-
dominated prices) continues and is h<>ing enlarged. It includes, as we 
have noted earlier, experiments with broader enterprise decision-
making rights, profit retention by enterprises, lateral enterprise 
purchase and sale contracts, and bank financing. One gets the 
impression, however, that, so far at least, the major result of 
economic readjustment (for that is what these experiments amount 
to) has been the discarding of Maoist accretions and a return to the 
underlying administrative command structure adapted from the 
Soviets in the early 1950s and Sinicized by Deng's men in the early 
1960s. "Probably one of the most important aspects of the transition 
from Maoist to Dengist economic planning, with the latter typified by 
Zhao [Zhiyang's] Sichuan experiment, i<> the exclusion from the 
planning process of concepts rooted in war, encirclement, and sheer 
survival."75 The more important question is still where to go on from 
here, since the Soviet model, however much modified to fit Chinese 
conditions, will not do the job of modernization. 
Pilot enterprises are nowadays allowed to market directly part of 
their state-set quota output and all above-quota output. The exact 
proportions are subject to negotiation with superior planning author-
ities. For example, the Chongqing, Taiyuan, and Anshan iron and 
steel complexes have been permitted to market directly (i.e., not via 
the material supplies network) respectively 19, 15, and 5 percent of 
their 1980 output or a total of 400,000 tons of steel products. In fact, 
no two cases of direct marketing are the same. Pilot enterprises may 
also start new production lines not specifically endorsed by their 
supervisory ministries. They can merge with other firms or set up 
joint ventures. However, and this is important, they can do all this 
when and only when they have fulfilled the state plans for output, 
delivery, sales, productivity, innovation, and so on. The plan comes 
75. David Bonavia, "In Economy, Learn from Sichuan," Far Eastern Economic 
Review rFEERJ, November 21, 1980, p. 31. 
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first; relative freedom of enterprise action comes second. The Soviet 
reforms of the late 1950s and early 1960s were similar. In Russia the 
plan took most of the available inputs. The managers' complaint (like 
the complaint of Soviet consumers) was that they had the money, but 
that there was nothing they could buy with it once the state planners 
were through with their output commands and input allocations. 
Depending on the tautness of the state plan, this could prove to be 
true of China too. 
Direct marketing (lateral contracting by some firms) is said to 
have declogged some of the supply bottlenecks and improved the 
quality of products (i.e., producers produce for consumers and not for 
planners; they produce goods that are saleable instead of just 
volume). On the other hand, in addition to the problems mentioned 
earlier in the paper, other difficulties have cropped up. One is simply 
an extension of the problem already encountered in compulsory 
delivery versus free sale of farm produce. Better quality steel and 
other products are sold directly at semi-free, floating, "limit" prices, 
which as a rule are higher (i.e., yield more profit) than state-fixed 
prices for compulsory quota deliveries. The result is that better 
quality steel will be sold directly, while poorer quality steel will go to. 
the government. This simple and natural propensity of human nature 
to maximize its satisfactions is made all the easier by the reported 
prevalence of "unscientific" (meaning "soft" or easily fulfillablel 
output quotas introduced during the years of cultural muscle flexing. 
It is encouraged by the policy of allowing the experimental enter-
prises to keep a portion of their profits and to spend that portion as 
enterprise managements see fit- outside the plan. Profit retention 
rates are subject to negotiation. There are at present many combina-
tions of profit retention, depreciation allowance retention, and profit 
taxation. Overall, three basic experimental schemes exist: 
(1) retention by the enterprise of 5 percent of planned profit and 20 
percent of above-planned profit (this is bound to lead enterprises to 
seek a soft planned profit plan); (2) retention by the enterprise of 
20-30 percent of total (planned and above plan) profit; (3) full 
self-management, under which the enterprise is responsible for its 
own profits and losses, is taxed on its profits, and pays a capital 
charge on its fixed assets. In general, the movement of the 
experiment is supposed to be from (1) to (3). 
The search for profit is not restricted to producing enterprises. 
For example, the Institute of Physics of the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences had by the end of 1980 contracted some 20 new technologies 
to 20 factories on terms that included the transfer to the Institute of 
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enterprise profits derived from the technology on a sliding scale (20 
percent in the first year, 10 percent in the second, 5 percent in the 
third, and so on, or alternatively royalty payments based on sales and 
also on a sliding scale.)76 
Increased self-management has been accompanied by expansion 
of the role of banks in enterprise capital financing. Medium-temi 
lending in Sichuan Province rose 21 per cent in 1980. In the country 
as a whole, large and medium power and textile industry projects 
entirely financed by bank loans amounted to 2.8 billion yuan (end 
1980). This should be kept in perspective. In 1980 planned state 
expenditures on capital constructioP were roughly 30 billion yuan, 
plus 5 billion yuan for enterprise renovation. 
3. Worker Participation. As noted, worker participation in 
management is on the agenda. It is seen as a component part of the 
incentive system. In fact, it is the main nonmaterial incentive of the 
post-Mao era. Participation is to be structured in two ways: (1) 
through the resuscitated trade unions, and (2) through direct 
elections (by "secret ballot") of workshop supervisors and even plant 
directors. 
The state-controlled trade unions are apparently not doing the 
job expected of them because the job cannot be done. If they are truly 
to speak up for the workers' interests they will have to be liberated 
from their feudal status vis-a-vis the state. Moreover, trade union 
leaders know on which side their bread is buttered: they are in awe of 
senior officials of all stripes, including enterprise managers. Like 
other bureaucrats they worry about possible future retribution and 
present legal or extra-legal action against them if they argue the 
workers' case too eloquently. 77 
"Workers' self-management" also appears to be faltering. Here 
the problem is twofold: (a) the workers doubt that workers' congres-
ses and elections of factory officials will in reality change anything 
very much, and (b) they are not convinced that the election 
procedures are above-board. In any event, "the strongest motivation 
for working harder and more efficiently now ... is money and not 
the right of workers to elect their own officials."78 More money 
without more consumer goods is not going to do the trick either. 
* * * * 
76. CBR, November/December 1980, p. 3. 
77. FEER, October 31, 1980, p. 9. 
78. Harry Bernstein, "Major Shifts in China Put Labor in Control," Los Angeles 
Times, December 26, 1980, p. 24. 
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The tentative conclusions reached in the original paper remain. 
China's economic problems are not all that different from those 
experienced by other similarly placed developing countries. There, as 
in China, systemic defects compound the objective difficulties inhe-
rent in the developmental process. It is to the credit of the post-Mao 
leaders that they do not shirk from admitting the existence of 
institutional obstacles to development and modernization and that 
they are taking steps to reduce them. The experimental phase is now 
at a crucial point. The reform movement could easily fizzle out, as it 
did in the Soviet Union, in which case China will be left with a 
cumbersome Soviet-type system, a very imperfect vehicle in which to 
travel along the long and tortuous road to modernization. 
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